The market efficiency hypothesis and the behaviour of stock returns on the JSE securities exchange by Mabhunu, Mind
  
THE MARKET EFFICIENCY HYPOTHESIS AND THE BEHAVIOUR OF 
STOCK RETURNS ON THE JSE SECURITIES EXCHANGE 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
 
 
MASTER OF COMMERCE IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
of 
 
RHODES UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
MIND MABHUNU 
 
 
January 2004 
 ii 
DECLARATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Except for references specifically indicated in the text, and such help as I have 
acknowledged, this thesis is wholly my own work and has not been submitted at any 
other University or College for degree purposes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
Mind Mabhunu 
 
 
 
 
Grahamstown 
January 2004 
 iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
While the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EHM) has been widely accepted as robust by 
many researchers in the field of capital markets, the hypothesis’ robustness has been 
under increased scrutiny and question lately. In the light of the concerns over the 
robustness of the EMH, the weak form efficiency of the JSE is tested. Stock returns used 
in the analysis were controlled for thin trading and it was discovered that once returns are 
controlled for thin trading, they are independent of each other across time. Some of the 
previous studies found the JSE to be inefficient in the weak form but this research found 
that the JSE is efficient in the weak form. A comparison is also made between the JSE 
and four other African stock markets and the JSE is found to be more efficient than the 
other markets.  
 
The developments on the JSE, which have improved information dissemination as well as 
the efficiency of trading, contributed to the improvement of the JSE’s efficiency. The 
improvement in operational efficiency and turnover from the late 1990s has also made a 
major contribution to the improvement in the weak form efficiency of the JSE.  
 
Theory proposes that if markets are efficient then professional investment management is 
of little value if any; hence the position of professional investment managers in efficient 
markets is investigated.  Although the JSE is found to be efficient, at least in the weak 
form, it is argued that achieving efficiency does not necessarily make the investment 
manager’s role obsolete. Investment managers are needed even when the market can be 
proved to be efficient.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
If a stock market is operationally efficient there is little, or no, friction in the trading 
process. Information on prices and volumes of past transactions is widely available and 
price sensitive information is both timely and accurate; thus information dissemination is 
fast and wide.  Liquidity is such that it enables market participants to buy or sell quickly 
at a price close to the prior (last traded) price. Also, there is price continuity, such that 
prices do not change much from one transaction to another unless significant new 
information becomes available.  
 
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), an operationally efficient stock 
market is expected to be externally and informationally efficient; thus “security prices at 
any point in time are an unbiased reflection of all the available information” on the 
security’s expected future cash flows and the risk involved in owning such a security 
(Reilly and Brown 2003: 57). Such a market provides accurate signals for resource 
allocation as market prices represent each security’s intrinsic worth. Market prices can at 
times deviate from the securities’ true value, but these deviations are completely random 
and uncorrelated.  
 
Price changes are only expected to result from the arrival of new information. Given that 
there is no reason to expect new information to be non-random, period-to-period price 
changes are expected to be random and independent. In other words, they must be 
“unforecastable if they are properly anticipated, i.e. if they fully incorporate the 
expectations and information of all market participants” (Lo, 1997: xii). 
 
It is expected that the more efficient a market, the more random the sequence of its price 
movements, with the most efficient market being the one in which prices are completely 
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random and unpredictable (Fama, 1965; Lo, 1997). In an efficient market information 
gathering and information based trading is not profitable as all the available information 
is already captured in the market prices. This may leave investors with no incentive as to 
the gathering and analysing of information, for they begin to realise that market prices are 
an unbiased estimate of the shares’ intrinsic worth.  
 
‘Noise’ trading1 or imperfect information aggregation may lead to the breakdown of the 
informational, and therefore allocative, efficiency properties of a competitive market. If 
more and more market participants stop investing in information then less information 
will be incorporated in prices and the prices will therefore be ‘noisy’ (Fama, 1970; 
Samuelson, 1965). However, in an open market, where there are numerous profit 
maximising participants, arbitrage is expected to cause the market to return to efficiency. 
The numerous investors in the market will exploit the even smallest informational 
advantage at their disposal, thereby incorporating their information into market prices and 
eliminating the profit opportunities that may have been presented by the information.  
 
In a market where there are no barriers to trade this must occur instantaneously so that no 
profits can be garnered from information based trading because such profits will have 
already been arbitraged away. Investors should therefore choose among the shares that 
represent ownership of the firm’s activities under the assumption that the prevailing 
market prices are an unbiased estimate of a share’s intrinsic value (Black, 1986; Lo, 
1997). 
 
4.1 Why the stock market is likely to be efficient 
 
There are many characteristics which make the securities markets in general, and stock 
markets in particular, unique and potentially more efficient that other markets. Though 
these characteristics are not sufficient in themselves to ensure an efficient market, they go 
a long way into making the stock market a perfectly competitive market, as would be 
defined by an economist, and therefore efficient. These characteristics are as follows: 
 
                                                 
1
 Noise traders trade on noise as if it were information.   
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4.1.1 Informational support 
 
One of the most outstanding features of the securities market is the “highly organised and 
elaborate information machinery [that] services it.” (Keane, 1983:7). It is not only 
superior in terms of quality and quantity of information, but also “in the rapidity with 
which the information is disseminated to market participants.” (Keane, 1983:7). All the 
securities markets invest sizable amounts in their efforts to provide real time information 
to their members. Even though some markets also provide information to their 
participants, information provision is not as critical and as extensive as in the securities 
market (Lo, 1997). 
 
7.1.1 Homogeneity 
 
The securities market, unlike other markets, comprises substantially of the same product 
– the claim to future returns subject to risk. The underlying operations of the companies 
may be diverse and individualistic, but the share prices are primarily determined by the 
expected future claims subject to the associated risk, a feature that provides a fair degree 
of comparability. This causes different shares to be basically the same product making 
them highly substitutable (Damodaran, 1996).  
 
7.1.2 Taste independence  
 
Securities are unlike other products, such as paintings, where tastes and not pricing 
models play a huge role in the pricing. Individual investors may have different ‘tastes’, or 
rather preferences, with regard to risk, but this taste only affects the portfolio mix in 
terms of risky and riskless assets and not the value of individual securities relative to each 
other (Damodaran, 1996; Keane, 1983). “There is no pricing model that can readily 
explain the relative difference in the value of a Dali and a Degas,” but the specific risk 
and return associated with a security is assumed to have a particular value to an investor 
of whatever risk preference (Keane, 1983: 6).  
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7.1.3 Location independence 
 
While the value of many other commodities is dependent on physical location, the value 
of securities is substantially independent of location. With dual listings on the increase 
and substantial reduction in foreign exchange barriers, traders have access to all markets, 
irrespective of their normal place of business (Keane 1983). Undervalued stocks on the 
New York Stock Exchange are of much importance to a South African asset manager, 
whereas cheaper accommodation in Cape Town is of little or no importance to 
Polokwane municipal workers, and less still to those in Harare.  
 
2.2 Discussion of terms and explanation of principles  
 
2.2.1 Correct share price 
 
The object of the Efficient Market debate is not necessarily to determine whether share 
prices can be demonstrated to be correct, but whether the evidence relating to past prices 
and available information is sufficient to warrant the assumption that current prices are 
correct. The correct price should not necessarily predict the future, but should give an 
unbiased estimate of the returns expected from holding a security, while capturing the 
risks involved in holding such a security. The accuracy of the prediction depends on the 
efficient use of the information at the time of the pricing decision, and not necessarily 
upon the final outcome. The validity of this ‘correctness’ is not diminished by the fact 
that at the critical stage of making the investment decisions, the correctness, or otherwise, 
of the share price is essentially a subjective assessment. Though the assessment of 
correctness is subjective, “it is, however, a subjective assessment about an objective 
phenomenon, … therefore it is verifiable.” (Keane, 1983:17).   
 
4.1.2 Intrinsic worth 
 
If the market ‘sets the odds’ correctly the price of a share will represent its true worth. 
Worth denotes the best valuation of a share, but does not signify that the investor is 
guaranteed any particular return, only that the price fully reflects all the associated risks, 
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and that the expected return is commensurate with those risks (Keane, 1983, Samuelson, 
1965). While earnings prospects and the associated risks can be used to determine 
intrinsic worth, in the world of uncertainty, the actual intrinsic ‘value’ is not known. 
 
4.1.3 Random Walk 
 
‘Random’ here does not mean, neither should it be taken to imply, that the price 
movements are whimsical and chaotic. All it means is that period-to-period price 
changes should be statistically independent and unforecastable if they are properly 
anticipated. Price movements are a perfectly rational response to information but since 
there is no reason to expect new information to be non-random, price changes based on 
this information is supposed to be random and uncorrelated to any observable trend 
(Fama, 1970). 
 
4.1.4 Arbitrage 
 
Arbitrage is defined here as information trading aimed at profiting from imperfections in 
the current price. Arbitrage is normally defined as “simultaneous purchase and sale of the 
same, or essentially similar, security in two different markets for advantageously 
different prices,” implying an undertaking requiring no capital and entailing no risk. (Lee, 
2001:236) In reality, however, almost all arbitrage requires capital and is risky (See 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Not only do the arbitrageurs have to manage the risk of a 
position, but they also bear “the risk that noise traders’ beliefs [may] not revert to their 
mean for a long time and might in the meantime be even more extreme.” (DeLong, 
Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann 1990: 704). 
 
4.1.5 Noise 
 
Noise is a disturbance, especially a random and persistent disturbance, which obscures or 
reduces the clarity of a signal. It is what makes our observations imperfect and keeps us 
from knowing what the actual expected return on a security is. If all traders could have 
noiseless information there would be no reason to expect them to take opposite positions 
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in a trade as their information is supposed to point to the same thing. According to Black 
(1986), noise makes secondary financial markets possible since the main drive behind 
trading is different views on the prospects of a security.  
 
Noise in the world, and in financial markets, has caused certain things to became 
essentially unobservable, and for this reason people adopt rules of thumb. They share 
these rules of thumb but very few people have enough experience, or rather expertise, in 
interpreting noisy evidence to see that these rules are too simple. Even highly trained 
people seem to make certain kinds of errors consistently. For example, the use of betas in 
financial markets is based upon the strong tendency to assume that when two events 
frequently happen together, one causes the other. While its easy to resist rules of thumb 
in simple cases, they seem to creep back strongly when pricing models and risk and 
return models become more complex (Campbell et al., 1997; Merton, 1985).  
 
2.3 Forms of efficiency 
 
The EMH is divided into three forms depending on the information set to which prices 
adjust. These are weak, semi-strong and strong form. 
 
2.3.1 Weak form   
 
If the market is efficient in the weak form, prices reflect all past security market 
information; hence information on past prices and trading volumes cannot be used for 
profit. Investigating the presence of any statistically significant dependence 
(autocorrelation or price runs), or any recognisable trend in share prices changes, is 
traditionally used to directly test weak form efficiency. Research has also tested whether 
any trading rules could be demonstrated to be superior to a passive buy and hold strategy 
(See Dryden, 1970; Jensen and Bennington, 1970).  
 
Nevertheless there are numerous pitfalls associated with these tests. Researchers 
normally use only limited publicly available data on prices and trading volumes. 
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However, investors use more extensive data, some of which is only available to the 
members of the exchange. For example, while traders use data on bid and offer spreads, 
in addition to prices and volumes, researchers mainly use (closing) prices and volumes 
only. Traders normally employ complicated trading rules, but researchers normally test 
simple trading rules using samples of large firms whose shares are actively traded Most 
researchers also fail to appropriately account for transaction costs and adjust for risk 
when testing trading rules. (Reilly and Brown, 2003). 
 
Weak form tests are the most numerous in terms of both frequency and research target, 
and the results mainly support weak form efficiency. In some cases, statistically 
significant dependence in return series has been found, but Fama (1970: 414) maintains 
that “some of [the dependence] is consistent with the fair game model and the rest does 
not appear to be sufficient to declare market[s] inefficient.” In any case, most of the profit 
opportunities presented by the trends tend to fall away when transaction costs are taken 
into account. 
 
2.3.2 Semi strong form 
 
A strong-form efficient market is a market in which prices fully reflect all publicly 
available information. This form is concerned with both the speed and accuracy of the 
market’s reaction to information as it becomes available. 
 
Event studies that examine how stock prices adjust to specific significant economic 
events have been used to directly test semi-strong form efficiency. Events normally tested 
are stock splits, initial public offerings (IPO), company announcements (especially 
earnings and dividend announcements) and other unexpected economic and other world 
events. Various other methods have been employed to test the semi-strong efficiency. 
Researchers have tested the significance of price to earnings (P/E) and other ratios, the 
effect of firm size and many other characteristics that can be derived from publicly 
available information. Other researchers have performed time series analyses on returns 
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as well as on the cross sectional distribution of returns of individual stocks to find if any 
profit opportunities exist (Damodaran, 1996; Reilly and Brown 2003).  
 
Most studies support the Efficient Market Hypothesis for developed markets but reject it 
for developing markets. The reason for this is that most of the developed markets have far 
more advanced systems of information disclosure and processing as compared to the 
developing markets (Keane, 1983). However there are several studies that provided 
evidence of inefficiency. Many researchers found strong differences in return behaviour 
across time and across stocks; returns on some of the markets exhibited anomalies such 
as the small firm or neglected firm effect, the weekend effect and the January effect, 
among others (Ritter, 1988; Haugen and Lakonishok, 1988). All in all, the results on 
semi-strong tests may be best described as mixed, depending not only on the market 
tested but also on the testing methods employed. 
 
2.3.3 Strong form  
 
The strong form efficiency, in which prices are expected to reflect both public and private 
information, seems to be more concerned with the disclosure efficiency of the 
information market than the pricing efficiency of the securities market. Tests for the 
strong form efficiency are mainly centred on finding whether any group of investors, 
especially those who can have access to information otherwise not publicly available, can 
consistently enjoy abnormal returns.  
 
Groups normally tested are corporate insiders, stock exchange specialists, security 
analysts and professional asset managers. The results are mixed especially when 
professional money managers are involved but the bulk of the evidence does not support 
the hypothesis of strong form efficiency (Jensen, 1968; Damodaran, 1996). Also the 
strong form efficiency is not as theoretically robust as the other two; intuition suggests 
that prices are not expected to capture information before it is published (Keane, 1983). 
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2.4 The research problem 
 
The EMH implies that no group of investors should be able to consistently find 
undervalued or overvalued securities using a pre-selected strategy. If, say, overvalued 
securities can be found, then arbitrageurs will short them until they are ‘correctly’ priced. 
Failing this, it is expected that all investors will be able to discover the same securities 
such that, if one wants to sell, the only other person willing to trade will also be selling. If 
a superior strategy could be found, investors will adapt it until its superiority is 
neutralised. Rational Expectations literature suggests that there should be very little or no 
trading in individual stocks under these conditions (Lo, 1997). However, on a typical day 
millions of shares exchange hands on the JSE Securities Exchange and on other stock 
exchanges around the world.  
 
Given this appetite for trading, the billions spent on asset management and the massive 
arbitrage activity present in today’s securities markets, it will be unconvincing to say that 
information trading has no place in an efficient market. If the markets were sufficiently 
efficient to provide no profitable opportunities to information traders, then it should be 
expected that active money managers would not exist. Nevertheless the EMH also asserts 
that noise trading will not survive in an open market as long as there are arbitrageurs, in 
which case there will be no place for both ‘noise’ and informed traders. It therefore is 
reasonable to assume that there is continuous availability of profit making opportunities 
which sustains the operations and existence of traders, be they informed or uninformed, 
otherwise the robustness of the hypothesis is questionable (Lee, 2001). 
 
The EMH has been widely accepted as valid, but evidence against market efficiency is 
mounting. To some this evidence is disturbing and they raise concerns on potential 
sampling errors, the formative nature of behavioural theories as well as other econometric 
concerns (See Kothari, 2001). However, to other researchers, it is ‘liberating’ and 
‘enough’ to cast doubts over the robustness of the Efficient Markets proposition (Lee, 
2001; Dyckman and Morse, 1986). These researchers maintain that price adjustment to 
new information is a continuous process and does not occur instantaneously. The market 
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is continuously seeking to price securities correctly, making the current price, “at best, a 
noisy (or incomplete) proxy of the security’s true fundamental value” (Lee, 2001:237).  
 
In the wake of these increased concerns over the robustness of the EMH it is important to 
test the efficiency of the local stock market. The degree to which the JSE is efficient 
affects all those who invest on the bourse; be they individual investors or professional 
managers. The accounting and economic research needed to make investment decisions, 
the regulatory standards, performance evaluation, and even corporate disclosure decisions 
are dependent, to some degree, on the efficiency of the market.  
 
Previous research on the JSE has concluded that information is impounded slowly into 
prices (Knight, 1998; Bhana, 1994), and that share prices did not adjust efficiently to 
publicly available information (Bhana, 1990; Da Silva, 1989; Kelly, 1984). It should 
however be noted that the JSE has, subsequently, undergone massive transformation to 
increase information flow, and to reduce insider trading and transaction costs (among 
other things), all of which are expected to improve the overall operational efficiency, and 
hence the informational efficiency of the exchange.   
 
Testing the absolute efficiency of a market does not seem to be the most informative 
method of gauging the efficiency of a given market. Relative efficiency – the efficiency 
of one market, or one index, measured against the other – appears to be a more useful 
concept than the all or nothing view taken by traditional literature and most of the 
previous studies, including the studies on the JSE mentioned above. Even more useful 
will be the concept of measuring a market’s efficiency across time to find out if the level 
of efficiency has changed. In fact perfect efficiency, as tested by most of the previous 
researchers, is “an ‘unrealistic’ benchmark that is unlikely to hold in practice” (Campbell 
et al., 1997:24). This research therefore measures the efficiency of the JSE both in 
absolute and in relative terms.  
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2.5 Goals of the research 
 
The main goal of the research is to test the weak form efficiency of the South African 
stock market both in absolute and in relative terms.  
 
The objectives can be stated as follows: 
 
• Test the weak form efficiency of the JSE. 
• Compare efficiency across time for the Top 40 index, and the All Share index. 
• Discuss the relative efficiency of the JSE with reference to four other African 
stock exchanges. 
 
7.2 Organisation of work  
 
The layout of this paper is as follows: Chapter two gives on overview of the JSE and the 
other stock markets that are used in this study. This study is on the JSE; thus there is a 
more extensive overview of the JSE than all the other markets.  Chapter three outlines the 
EMH and the theoretical basis of the hypothesis. In the same chapter is also presented the 
position of current investment practices in relation to the EMH. Numerous research has 
been done to test the hypothesis both in developing and developed markets. A review of 
the research that has been carried out on the subject is presented in chapter four. The 
review is by no mean exhaustive, but it is a selection of results that represent a sample of 
the different findings. A review of the research done on the JSE is presented first and is 
divided according to the levels of efficiency being tested. The remainder of the review is 
divided according to the markets (developed and developing) and then according to the 
three levels of efficiency (weak, semi-strong and strong form). While effort was made to 
present these results in chronological order, the main focus was on the nature of the 
results, than the time the individual researches were carried out.  
 
The methodology and data used in this study are detailed in chapter five. This includes 
the measurement of variables as well as the derivation of the models used to measure the 
variables. The findings follow in chapter six as well as the interpretation of those 
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findings. The paper is concluded in chapter seven, where possible areas of further 
research are pointed out.  
 
The following chapter provides on overview of the JSE and the other stock markets that 
underlie this study. The other stock markets are: the Casablanca Stock Exchange of 
Morocco, the Cairo and Alexandra Stock Exchanges of Egypt, the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange of Kenya and the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. The overview of the JSE is more 
extensive than the overview of the other exchanges since this study is on the JSE. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE JSE SECURITIES EXCHANGE SOUTH AFRICA2 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
The JSE Securities Exchange South Africa (JSE) is the only stock exchange currently 
operating in South Africa. There is statutory provision for the operation of more than one 
stock exchange but only the JSE is in operation. Since its formation, the JSE went 
through vast changes, including numerous changes in premises utilisation, trading 
systems, management and modification of rules, among other things. While some of 
these changes are presented in the sections that follow, the sections are by no means 
exhaustive. Attention is given to changes that are believed to have impacted on the 
efficiency of trading, reduced costs of both trading and the running of the exchange, and 
increased the exchange’s efficiency in information dissemination. Changes that affect 
informational efficiency as postulated in the EMH take centre stage. It must again be 
noted that the main focus is not on the chronology of changes but on the purpose of these 
changes, or rather, their purported effect on market efficiency.  
 
2.0 History and development of the JSE 
 
Benjamin Woollan founded the JSE (then Johannesburg Stock Exchange) in 1887 
primarily to provide a facility through which investors could buy and sell shares after the 
discovery of the Witwatersrand gold fields and the subsequent formation of the mining 
and investment companies. Industrial shares were virtually non-existent due to the lack of 
industrial development in the country then. The JSE was admitted as a member of the 
Federation International Bourses de Valeurs (FIBV) in 1963 and became an active 
member of the African Stock Exchange in 1993.  Since its inception and up to the 8th of 
November 1993 all stockbrokers were required to be South African citizens. On the same 
day that this requirement was scrapped, the South African Institute of Stockbrokers, 
                                                 
2Unless otherwise indicated, the information on the JSE was obtained from the JSE website, www.jse.co.za 
[Accessed on 11 August 2003] referenced JSE, 2003. 
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which is responsible for the examination, admission, and disciplining of stockbrokers was 
formed and the option of corporate membership with limited liability, subject to the 
appropriate capital requirements, was introduced.  
 
Currently the JSE is planning to demutualise so that it may become a listed company. The 
main reason behind the proposed demutualisation is the need to “ increase the efficiency 
of the Exchange against the background of a global environment that is becoming more 
and more competitive” (JSE, 2003(a)). It is anticipated that by listing, the JSE would be 
better able to raise the capital it needs to develop and improve its services to counteract 
the competition threat. Even after becoming a public company, the JSE will still have to 
apply yearly to the Licensing Committee of the Financial Services Board for an operating 
licence. 
 
3.0 Trading and settlement  
 
During the mid-90s there was need to bring about transformation on the JSE, as 
competitive pressure from revolutionary technological developments in the financial 
markets across the globe was being felt. The pressure to reduce costs and develop more 
efficient and transparent trading, clearing and settlement systems, was increasing with the 
globalisation of financial markets and the improvement communication systems. 
 
In line with global developments, on 7 June 1996, the open outcry-trading floor was 
closed to give way to an order driven, centralised, automated trading system known as the 
JSE Equities Trading (JET) system. Dual trading and negotiated brokerage were also 
introduced. On 13 May 2002 the JET system gave way to the JSE SETS (Stock Exchange 
Trading System), a trading system implemented in conjunction with the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE). The new system is expected to increase the transparency and liquidity 
of trading on the JSE.  
 
Clearing and settlement is done electronically through STRATE (Share TRAnsactions 
Totally Electronic) a system introduced in November 1999. STRATE Limited is the 
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Central Securities Depository for the South African equity market, and deals only with 
Central Securities Depository Participants (CSDP), which are the transfer secretaries, 
approved by the Financial Services Board. Under this system script (share certificates) is 
“dematerialised”, i.e. ownership of shares is evidence by a computer-generated statement 
sent from CSDPs to shareholders on monthly basis. The ultimate aim is to eliminate the 
dependence on paper in the form of share certificates and transfer documents.  
 
According the JSE, STRATE has ushered in a new era of clearing and settlement, which 
did not only boost the JSE’s competitiveness in the international financial markets, but 
also improved South Africa’s standing in terms of settlement and operational risk. The 
system was introduced after back office support services could no longer handle the 
increase in daily transactions efficiently in a paper-based environment. This came after 
the successful implementation of the JET system contributed to a massive leap in 
turnover. Electronic settlement involves a seamless rolling clearing and settlement within 
five working days of dealing. 
 
4.0 Size of the market 
 
By the end of May 2003, 443 companies, with a total market capitalisation of R1 460 
billion, were listed on the JSE. Though market capitalisation dropped from the 2001 high 
of R1 770.7 billion, it still compares favourably to other emerging markets. Total yearly 
turnover value was at its highest at the end of 2002 and by May 2003 the market had 
already posted a turnover of R63.39 billion, which is higher than the yearly total for 
1995. There was a significant increase in liquidity from a mere 6.3% in 1995 to 34.6% in 
1999 and 39.6% by May 2003 (See Table 2.1, next page). 
 
The JSE ranking among world and emerging markets is presented in Table 2.2. The JSE 
was on the pole position according to market capitalisation among emerging markets at 
the end of 1995. It has lost this position due to the increased number of de-listings since 
then. In 1991 a total of 740 companies had their shares listed on the JSE, but the number 
had decreased to 443 by the end of May 2003. Though there was no improvement in the 
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JSE’s world rankings according to market capitalisation, there was a significant 
improvement in its ranking by market activity (according to both turnover and liquidity). 
 
Table 2.1 Summary of market size and trading 
Year 
 
Market capitalization 
R (bn) 
Number of 
companies 
Turnover value 
R (bn)   
Liquidity 
% 
     
1991 508 740 22.23 n/a 
1995 1022 638 63.25 6.3 
1999 1616 668 448.38 34.6 
2001 1771 542 606.14 38.5 
2002 1584 472 808.66 39.1 
     
May-03 1460 443 63.39 39.6 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 Rankings 
Year    Market capitalisation Turnover value Liquidity% 
     
1995 World 12 30 38 
 Emerging markets 1 2 2 
     
1999 World 19 24 38 
 Emerging Markets 3 5 5 
     
2001 World 17 22 26 
 Emerging markets 4 3 3 
     
2002 World 14 19 23 
 Emerging markets 4 4 4 
     
May-03 World 16 20 n/a* 
  Emerging markets 4 4 n/a* 
 
* Data not available 
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5.0 Stock Exchange News Service (SENS) 
 
The need to keep the market adequately informed cannot be overemphasised, but caution 
should be taken to ensure that a balance is maintained between this need and the dangers 
of creating a false market. Investors use information on companies, in particular, and the 
economy, in general, to make their investment decisions. This information is 
disseminated into the market through company announcements, as well as other 
announcements by fiscal and monetary authorities. Although companies may want to 
comply with the legal and regulatory requirements and maintain a constructive 
relationship with the market, it has not always been clear when cautionary 
announcements should be made, and what exactly should be included in these 
announcements.  
 
In a bid to clear the grey areas, the JSE issued ‘The Guidelines on the Dissemination of 
Price Sensitive Information’ and subsequently introduced SENS in August 1997. These 
guide lines were aimed at: improving the dissemination of price sensitive information; 
helping companies manage price sensitive information; and giving the media, company 
advisors, institutional shareholders and analysts a greater understanding of the framework 
within which companies should disseminate such information. However, notwithstanding 
the guidelines, companies are encouraged to make their own judgements regarding timing 
of information dissemination in the light of the information’s possible effect on the 
market.  
 
SENS is a news service that seeks to ensure early, equal and wide dissemination of all 
information that is expected to have an effect on the prices of securities listed on the JSE. 
The requirement to release announcements through SENS became obligatory on 15 
October 1997, and the JSE listing requirements have since been amended to 
accommodate the introduction of SENS.  
 
‘Price sensitive information’ as defined by SENS is any “unpublished information, 
which, if it were to be published, would reasonably likely affect a company’s share price” 
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(JSE, 2003(c)). The fact that a company is in possession of price sensitive information 
does not necessarily trigger a duty to disclose, as long as the information remains 
confidential. However if it is reasonably believed that confidentiality cannot be 
maintained, or that the information has leaked, a company has the duty to make 
cautionary announcements as soon as possible. After a cautionary announcement has 
been published, further cautionary announcements must be published every six weeks 
until a full announcement, or an announcement withdrawing the previous cautionary 
announcements, has been published.  
 
As a general principle, shareholders should receive fair and equal treatment; therefore 
companies should avoid consulting with material shareholders before other shareholders 
on price sensitive issues. In fact, the listing requirements stipulate that “companies may 
not release price sensitive information to any third party during JSE trading hours until 
the information has been published through SENS; and outside JSE trading hours, unless 
… arrangements have been made for such information to be published through SENS, 
prior to the next opening of [the] JSE” (JSE, 2003(c)).  
 
Notwithstanding the analysts’ constructive role in assisting the market in its 
understanding and evaluation of companies, the guidelines provide that companies should 
decline to answer analysts’ questions where the answers, singly or collectively, might 
provide or at least expose, price sensitive information. Draft reports from analysts sent 
with a view to commenting on inaccurate figures or assumptions should not even be 
corrected, unless the contents of the report cannot be regarded as price sensitive. 
Similarly, companies should not feel obliged to make a formal announcement correcting 
forecasts by analysts unless it is clear that the market is being materially misled. 
Companies with concerns of being misinterpreted, or mistakenly accused of providing 
price sensitive information, should establish internal procedures to reduce that risk. 
 
It is acknowledged that the media often contribute to a well-informed market, however 
dealings with the media need particularly careful management in instances where price 
sensitive, or potentially price sensitive, information is involved. Companies should be 
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prepared to give a ‘no comment’ answer when journalists are pressing for unpublished 
price sensitive information. Where there is a risk that sufficient price sensitive 
information has been collected for a story to be ‘broadly’ accurate, a company should 
ensure that an announcement is made through SENS and in the press to guarantee that the 
correct information is widely available. If it is apparently premature to publish the full 
information, a cautionary announcement, through SENS and the press, should be made. 
 
Five minutes prior to the release of any announcements through SENS, a neutral warning 
of an impending announcement is sent through the JSE SETS system. This provides 
traders with an opportunity to remove their orders from the system, if they so wish. 
Announcements received by SENS that have been authenticated and approved (where 
such approval is required) are transmitted electronically to the major wire services, where 
customers to these services will then have access to the full announcements. The 
company retains the responsibility of establishing a clear communication policy, and is 
still required to publish announcements in the press once the announcements have been 
issued through SENS. 
 
After the successful implementation and running of SENS the JSE introduced yet another 
information dissemination service called InfoWiz in May 2002. This ‘Live Data Delivery 
System’ transmits live data to subscribed information vendors, JSE members and 
financial institutions. InfoWiz broadcasts data on: best bid and offer; mid price; number 
and volume at best price; uncrossing price and volume3; official closing price; trade 
report volume and price; start of day reference data as well as full market depth and 
indices values.  SENS publications are also broadcast through InfoWiz.  
 
With SENS and InfoWiz up and running the JSE can be said to have done quite much to 
increase stakeholder value in terms of meeting their need for information. These services 
match the services provided by the most developed exchanges in the world. In fact 
InfoWiz is an equivalent of London Market Information Link (LMIL). It was 
                                                 
3
 During auction call phase. 
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implemented in partnership with the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the actual 
system is still housed in London.  The JSE chairman acknowledges that the exchange has 
made notable progress in the area of stakeholder communications, but “the enhancement 
of stakeholder communication [remained] a key area of focus in 2003” (JSE, 2003 (a)).           
 
6.0 Regulation of the stock exchange 
 
For a stock exchange to operate successfully, investors must have the confidence that 
they can deal at genuine and fair prices, and that the market is not manipulated to their 
disadvantage. A proper regulatory framework that is adhered to by all market 
participants, and is enforced by the appropriate regulatory authorities, brings about this 
confidence and integrity. Since its inception, the JSE’s regulatory framework has been 
based on self-regulation. Legislation relating to the JSE, as embodied in the Stock 
Exchanges Control Act (SECA) 1 of 1985 as amended in 1995, seeks to protect the 
interests of the general public in buying and selling shares without unduly infringing 
upon self-regulation. The Financial Services Board (FSB) administers SECA.  
 
In the interest of self-regulation the Act requires the exchange to draft its own rulebook, 
which must be approved by the Financial Services Board. The JSE executive has the 
authority and discretion to alter the trading period, close, suspend or halt trading, or take 
any such steps necessary to maintain an orderly market, notwithstanding any other 
provisions of the rules. The rules also detail the security procedures, reporting procedures 
and resources required by members to ensure the efficiency and integrity of the equities 
market as well as the proper functioning of the JSE trading system. 
 
7.0 Other African stock markets4 
 
For the sake of comparison the four African stock exchanges, used to analyse the relative 
efficiency of the JSE, are presented here. The Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchanges 
(CASE) form the Egyptian stock market. These two exchanges are housed in different 
                                                 
4
 Unless otherwise indicated, information in this section was primarily sourced from each of the stock 
markets’ respective websites as referenced in the bibliography.  
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cities but they share the same trading system and are governed but the same rules. The 
Casablanca Stock Exchange of Morocco comprises two markets, the Central Market and 
the Block Trade Market. All trades, except block trades, pass through the central market. 
The Block Trade market was set up in 1997 to cater for large orders normally submitted 
by institutional investors. Kenya and Zimbabwe have one stock exchange each, the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) and the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE), respectively.  
 
1.0.0 Trading and settlement 
 
With the exception of the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, which is open for trading from 
08h00 to 16h30, trading hours are limited on these markets. The NSE and the Casablanca 
Stock Exchange are open for trading only in the morning and the CASE is open for 
trading only between 11h30 and 15H30. These trading periods are rather short when 
compared to the JSE, which is open for trading form 09h00 to 16h00.  
 
In 1994 CASE introduced an automated trading system, and started dematerialising script 
in 2000. At least 90% of the script has been dematerialised to date. The electronic trading 
system was meant to enhance trading flexibility as well as increase market depth and 
liquidity. Clearing and settlement is done through Misr5 Clearing Settlement and 
Depository (MCSD), a private company which is also the central securities depository for 
CASE. The most actively traded shares are settled within two days, all the other 
dematerialised shares are settled within three days while physical shares are settled within 
four days.  
 
The Casablanca Stock Exchange is also automated, the automation of which was phased 
in between March 1997 and June 1998. Script is still physical but settlement is 
progressively moving towards simultaneous, rolling delivery versus payment. The 
Casablanca Depository is the central securities depository for the Casablanca Stock 
Exchange. 
 
                                                 
5
 s.i.c. 
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Trading on the ZSE is divided into two call-over sessions and clearing is done on 
transaction-by-transaction basis. The stock exchange still deals with physical script 
therefore settlement (which is within seven days) is against the physical delivery of 
script. Two local banks offer full custodian services for script since there is no central 
depository. The NSE, just like the ZSE, is still preparing for automation and 
dematerialisation the dates of which are not yet set. A t + 5 settlement was introduced in 
2000 but there is an allowance of up to seven days before the new share certificates have 
been issued. All these four markets are order driven just like the JSE, but on the 
Casablanca Stock Exchange some stock broking firms are market makers.  
 
2.0.0 Market size 
 
Data for 2003 could not be found; thus 2001 (and 2000 for Egypt) data is used here as the 
latest date for the purposes comparison. 
 
Table 2.3 Summary of market size and trading 
 
 
Market capitalisation 
US$ (bn) 
No of listed 
companies 
Turnover value 
US$ (bn) 
Liquidity 
% 
Egypt 
1995 
2000 
 
8.088 
12.300 
746 
1076 
0.677 
25.900 
10.0 
n/a* 
Kenya 
1995 
2001 
1.889 
1.095 
56 
49 
0.065 
0.040 
2.8 
3.0 
Morocco 
1995 
2001 
5.951 
9.290 
44 
55 
2.426 
2.362 
4.6 
10.0 
Zimbabwe 
1995 
2001 
2.038 
6.500 
64 
77 
0.150 
n/a* 
7.6 
n/a* 
South Africa 
1995 
2001 
280.769 
232.987 
740 
542 
17.376 
79.755 
6.3 
38.5 
 
* Data not available 
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As can be seen from Table 2.3, the JSE is large compared to the other African markets. 
Although the CASE had more listed companies than the JSE at the end of 2001, the JSE’s 
market capitalisation was 19 times that of the CASE. The turnover and liquidity of the 
JSE is also large compared to that of all the other markets. 
 
3.0.0 Information dissemination 
 
The Egypt Information Dissemination Company (EGID Co.) was established in the third 
quarter of 2001, four years after SENS had been introduced on the JSE, for the purposes 
of disseminating information to CASE participants. In Kenya, the NSE Information 
Centre and Library is meant to provide day-to-day updates to clients, but information 
provision is still low. A survey by the NSE itself revealed that there are a lot of 
information gaps in the Kenyan stock market and there is normally a gross lack of 
awareness of major news among market participants. The ZSE circulates trading records 
daily to broking houses and publish them in the press daily. The NSE, the Casablanca 
Stock Exchange and the ZSE provide news flashes on their websites but these are just 
headlines with links to the business news websites which carry the full stories. 
 
4.0.0 Regulation 
 
For each of the markets there are rules relating to listing, trading, settlement, and the 
general running and management of the exchange activities. It is generally agreed that 
self-regulation is the best way to maintain standards that safeguard the interests of 
investors; this explains why all the markets are self-regulated as is the JSE.  
 
The existence of comprehensive rules, per se, does not guarantee compliance, thus 
supervision and monitoring of the stock markets cannot be overemphasised. The NSE has 
a compliance department that monitors the disclosure of company information and 
ensures that market participants are aware of the rules as they are embodied in the rules-
book. In Zimbabwe and Morocco, Acts of Parliament regulate the rules and regulations 
governing the stock exchanges. The Acts provides for strict supervision and monitoring 
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of the stock exchange to ensure transparency and avoid market manipulation. The Capital 
Market Authority of Egypt supervises the MCSD and inspects its activities to unsure the 
trading, clearing and settlement are done in accordance with the rules and regulations of 
the stock exchange. 
 
In addition to strict supervision each of the stock exchanges has a guarantee fund. These 
funds were set up to reduce the risk of default by members of the relevant stock 
exchange. If a member fails to settle upon delivery of purchased securities, the exchange 
will make good the amount owing on the account of the guarantee fund. All members of 
the stock exchange are covered by the guarantee fund and they contribute to it.  
 
It is apparent that the JSE is more advanced than the other stock markets in respect of 
most of the issues considered above, except in terms of regulation where all stock 
exchanges have similarly strict regulation. Of course the CASE introduced automated 
trading before the JSE, but without the dematerialisation of script, the benefits of the 
system were limited. Also, liquidity and turnover on the Egyptian and the Casablanca 
Stock Exchanges is far below that of the JSE, despite the fact that they are both 
automated.  
 
The following chapter outlines the theory of market efficiency. Over the years the EMH 
was developed to be robust hypothesis and is especially supported by the rational 
expectations theory. The efficient market hypothesis suggests that if a market is found to 
be efficient neither technical analysis nor fundamental analysis is worthwhile. For this 
reason the position of current investment practices in relation to the EMH is also 
presented in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE THEORY OF MARKET EFFICIENCY 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the theory of market efficiency otherwise known as 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis from the theoretical point of view. Arguments and 
theoretical justification for the different views are presented together with the 
implications of this theory for the investment world.  
 
2.0 The Efficient Market Hypothesis6 
 
The main principle behind the EMH is that the price of a stock reflects all the information 
available to the market participants concerning the return and risk of that security. The 
current price represents the present value of all future dividends expected from holding 
the stock. If all the available information is factored into the market price, the market 
price will reflect the share’s worth or, rather, estimate its value, that is:  
∑
∞
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DEVP     (3.1) 
where tV  is defined as the share’s fundamental value at time t, )( itt DE +  is the expected 
dividend based on information available at time t, r is the appropriate risk adjusted 
discount rate for the expected dividend stream. i is up to infinity since a share is a 
perpetual instrument.  
 
All the information available to the market about future cash flows expected from 
holding a particular share is factored into the share’s price through trading. Trading 
brings together heterogeneous market participants, each seeking to maximise their 
utility7. As each trader participates in the market the information he or she has about a 
                                                 
6
 Hereafter referred to as the EMH. 
7
 Securities are sometimes held for reasons other than profit. 
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share is incorporated into the market price of the share; hence trading transmits the 
information from traders into the prices, making the price mechanism the aggregator of 
information currently available (Grossman, 1976; Lo, 1997).  
 
To illustrate how the price mechanism transmits and aggregates information, consider a 
market where the traders have diverse information. In period t, (the current period) each 
trader makes a prediction as to 1+tP , (the share price in period t+1) and then decides how 
much stock to hold. This will determine the current price tP , which will depend on the 
information received by all traders. Now assume that the thi  trader observes iy  (his/ her 
estimate of the future price), where 
iti ePy += +1 ,     (3.2) 
and ie  is a “noise” term which prevents any trader from knowing the true value of 1+tP . If 
we have n traders, the current equilibrium price )( tP  would be a function of nyyy ,...,, 21  
(each trader’s observed 1+tP ), that is  
),...,,( 21 ntt yyyPP =     (3.3) 
where .1>n  
 
A competitive pricing system is expected to efficiently aggregate all the traders’ 
information in such a way that the equilibrium price summarises all the information 
available to individual traders, thus ),...,,( 21 nt yyyP  becomes an efficient statistic for the 
unknown 1+tP . Although 1+tP  is unknown, traders believe that it is distributed 
independently of the ie s and that  
 ),~(~ 211 σ++ tt PNP    (3.4) 
i.e. the true value of 1+tP  is normally distributed around the market determined 1
~
+tP , with 
variance 2σ . The price system determines the price until a particular 1
~
+tP  is determined, 
and the thi  trader is able to learn the true value of 1+tP  from 1
~
+tP  within ie , where the 
expected ie~  is zero (Grossman, 1976: 573). 
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Given the joint distribution of y and 1~+tP , the equilibrium )(* yPt  is given by 
yyPt 10
* )( αα += ,    (3.5) 
where  ∑
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and ),...,,( 21 nyyyy = . 
fr is the exogenous rate of return on the risk free asset, and 0α  is a constant (which 
reflects other variables such as the thi  trader’s absolute risk aversion) (Grossman, 1976: 
576). 
 
The equilibrium )(* yPt  depends on iy  only through y . Given that any trader can learn 
y  by observing )(* yPt , and that y  is a more precise estimate of 1+tP  than iy , then 
inferences about the true 1+tP  can be made independently of iy  (Grossman, 1976; 
Grossman and Stiglitz 1980). A trader who invests in iy  and then observes 
),...,,( 21 nt yyyP , will find that iy  is redundant; ),...,,( 21 nt yyyP  contains all the 
information he requires, in fact “ ),...,,( 21 nt yyyP  reveal information that is of a higher 
quality to each trader than his own information” (Grossman, 1976:576). 
 
If a trader is given y , iy  provides no additional information about 1+tP  than that 
provided by y . Given that all traders can observe y , the implication is that those who 
invest in information will achieve the same utility as those who observe the market price. 
If a traders realise that they can do as well by observing only the market price (as they 
could if they purchase iy ), they have no incentive for investing in iy , when y , which is 
superior, is ‘free.’ Traders will invest less and less in information, begin to accept market 
prices as representing true differences in value and will choose stocks largely on the 
grounds of their attitude to risk. tP  will become increasingly ‘noisy’ as much of the 
relevant information will not be used in the price generating process. The resultant noisy 
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price or partial information aggregation will lead to a breakdown of the allocative 
efficiency properties of a competitive market (Black, 1986; Lucas Jr, 1972; Grossman 
and Stiglitz, 1980).  
 
It will, however, not be long before some traders realise the discrepancy in the price 
generating system.  If any one trader realises that a particular piece of information is 
apparently not factored in the price, he has an economic incentive to uncover it and trade 
on it. As more and more traders realise that there is an incentive to invest in information, 
the informational content of the prices increase until the market is restored to 
informational efficiency. Therefore market efficiency, as postulated, is brought about by 
arbitrage forces, which are constantly at work in an open market. Individuals in the 
economy may behave irrationally, but arbitrage forces are expected to keep the price in 
line with the security’s worth (Lucas, 1978).  
 
3.0 Some weak form market efficiency models   
 
The definitional statement of EMH is that prices ‘fully reflect’ all the available 
information. To verify this, the process of price formation has to be specified in model 
form, in order to define more precisely the empirical implications of ‘fully reflect.’ An 
assumption is made here that conditions of market equilibrium can be expressed in terms 
of expected returns. The expected returns can be expressed as  
 
tj
tjttj
ttj P
PPE
rE
,
,1,
1,
)()( −Φ=Φ ++   (3.6) 
and 
tjttjttj PrEPE ,1,1, )](1[)( Φ+=Φ ++   (3.7) 
 where  
E is the expected value operator 
r  is the one period percentage return  
 jP  is the price of security j 
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tΦ  is the information set that is reflected in the share price 
and itjP +,  is with cumulative dividends). 
 
The value of ttjr Φ+1,~ is determined by the particular expected return theory at hand. 
However, regardless of how the return is calculated, it is assumed that the information 
( tΦ ) is fully utilised in determining the expected return. It should be noted that the 
assumption that the conditions of market equilibrium can be stated in terms of expected 
returns, is purely a mathematical concept that is not attributed with any special 
importance by the EMH per se (Campbell, 1997; Keane, 1983).  
 
Defining ‘fully reflect’ in this sense implies that efficiency can be described using the fair 
game model, which expresses efficiency in terms of the opportunities for speculators to 
earn excess returns. Thus, the possibility of having trading systems based only on tΦ  
which earn expected returns in excess of the equilibrium expected returns is eliminated. If 
1, +tjX  is the excess market value of security j at time t+1 i.e. 
)( 1,1,1, ttjtjtj PEPX Φ−= +++    (3.8) 
then 
0)( 1, =Φ+ ttjXE     (3.9) 
or, if 
)( 1,1,1, ttjtjtj rErZ Φ−= +++    (3.10) 
then 
0)( 1, =Φ+ ttjZE     (3.11) 
so the sequence of 1, +tjX  and 1, +tjZ  is a fair game in respect to information sequence tΦ  
(Fama, 1970).  
 
If all the information available at time t is factored into the price, then price changes will 
only be expected to be a result of new information. Given that both the arrival and the 
quality of new information are not expected to be non-random, the sequence of price 
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changes is expected to be random, or rather “… to follow a random walk” (Kendall, 
1953). The ‘sub martingale’ and the random walk models are the two main cases of the 
fair game model, which explain the expected sequence of price movement. While the sub 
martingale model postulates that the price at time t is the best estimator of the price at 
time t+1, the random walk model defines efficiency in terms of lack of dependency 
between successive price movements (Fama and Blume, 1966; Fama, 1970)  
 
The dependence between a stock’s returns tr  and ktr +  at dates t and t + k respectively can 
be expressed in terms of their co-variances. In an efficient market, for an appropriately 
chosen )(⋅f and )(⋅g ,  
0)](),([ =+ktt rgrfCov    (3.12) 
for all t and for 0≠k , where )(⋅f and )(⋅g are arbitrary functions. Equation (3.12) 
captures all versions of random walk and martingale models (Campbell, 1997; Fama, 
1970).  
 
1.0.0 Martingale hypothesis 
 
The essence of the martingale hypothesis, whose origin lies in the history of the games of 
chance and probability theory, is that the stochastic process of { }tP , satisfies the 
following condition: 
ttttt PPPPPE =−−+ ,...),,( 211    (3.13) 
that is 
0,...),,( 211 =− −−+ ttttt PPPPPE   (3.14) 
If tW  represents one’s cumulative winnings from playing the same game of chance, then 
a fair game is one in which the expected wealth in the next period is simply equal to tW  
(this period’s wealth), i.e. the incremental winnings at any stage are expected to be zero, 
conditioned on the history of the game. In the same way, the martingale model states that 
1+tP  is expected to be equal to tP , or rather, the asset’s price change is expected to be 
zero when conditioned on the asset’s price history; hence the price is just as likely to rise 
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as it is to fall. The implication is that non-overlapping price changes are uncorrelated, 
such that linear forecasting of the future price using historical prices alone is ineffective 
and that, the ‘best’ forecast of tomorrow’s price is today’s price. ‘Best’ here means the 
one with minimum squared error (Campbell et al. 1997.) 
 
The martingale condition, which is considered to be necessary for an efficient securities 
market, is such that information in past prices is fully and perpetually reflected in current 
prices (Samuelson, 1973). Acceptance of the martingale condition will rule out the 
importance of technical analysis, as chartists cannot profit from using trends since they 
reveal no additional information (Samuelson, 1973; Campbell et al. 1997). 
 
Central to modern financial economics is the trade off between risk and expected return 
(See Damodaran, (1996) for a comprehensive study of modern asset valuation). Although 
the martingale model relates risk to expected returns, it does in no way account for it. 
Therefore, despite the intuitive appeal that the fair game interpretation has, it has been 
shown that “the martingale property is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
rationally determined asset prices” (Campbell et al., 1997: 31). Nevertheless, the 
martingale model still has important applications in modern theories of asset prices. In 
fact, it has been demonstrated that once asset returns are properly adjusted for risk, the 
martingale property does hold (Lucas, 1978; Cox and Ross, 1976; Harrison and Kreps, 
1979). This risk adjusted martingale property has led to a veritable revolution in pricing 
of complex financial instruments such as swaps, options and other derivative instruments 
(See Campbell (1997) and Merton (1990) for the derivation of different pricing models). 
Also, the development of the random walk hypothesis, a closely related model, is greatly 
indebted to the martingale model. 
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2.0.0 Random walk model 
 
The random walk model, as noted above, hypothesises that successive price changes are 
independent. If the equation 0)](),([ =+ktt rgrfCov  (3.12) holds for all functions, i.e. 
)(⋅f and )(⋅g  are unrestricted and can therefore assume even non-linear forms, then, 
returns are mutually independent, corresponding to random walk 1 and random walk 2 
models. In random walk 3, )(⋅f and )(⋅g are restricted to be arbitrarily linear and 
equation (3.12) implies that returns are serially uncorrelated. Random walk 1 and 2 are a 
much stronger sense of fair game than the martingale model because they imply that even 
the non-linear functions of price increments are uncorrelated (Campbell, 1997; Keane, 
1983). 
 
Random walk 1 implies that price increments are independently and identically 
distributed (IID), in which case the process of tP  is given by  
 
=tP tt eP ++ −1µ , ),0(~ 2σIIDet  (3.15) 
 
where µ  is the expected price change or drift. 
 
),0( 2σIID  denotes that the increments te  are independently and identically distributed 
with a zero mean and variance of 2σ . If the number of transactions per period (day, week 
or month) is very large, then the price changes across intervals will be sums of numerous 
independent variables. Under these conditions, the Central Limit theorem will lead us to 
expect the period-to-period price changes to be normally distributed. Kendall (1948) and 
Moore (1962) tested whether weekly price changes are normally distributed and they 
both found out that most are either leptokurtic or platykurtic. Despite the leptokurtosis 
and the platykurtosis, both Kendall and Moore felt that the evidence of normality was 
strong enough to support the hypothesis of near normality.  
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The assumption of identically distributed increments is apparently not feasible for 
financial asset prices over long periods of time. There is no reason to expect that 
unrelated and non-identical pieces of information to cause identical price changes. Also 
we cannot expect the probability distribution of daily stock prices to remain the same 
through changes in regulation, institutional environment and countless other changes that 
affect the stock market (Damodaran, 1996; Campbell, 1997).  
 
Financial time series have actually been shown to present time varying volatilities as well 
as deviation from normality (Lo, 1997; Hall and Urga, 2002). The focus therefore should 
be on non-predictability and the absence of correlation rather than normality. Any test 
statistic to be used should be sensitive to correlated price changes but robust to the many 
forms of heteroskedasticity and non-normality. 
 
Random walk 2 therefore relaxes the assumption of identical distribution and allows for 
heteroskedasticity in the te s to allow for the time variation in the volatility of stock’s 
return series. Relaxing of the identical distribution assumption in random walk 2 does not 
change the main economic property of the independently distributed te s, that is, “… any 
arbitrary transformation of future price increments [cannot be estimated] using any 
arbitrary transformation of past price increments” (Campbell, 1997:33). 
 
The conditional probability of 1+tP  remains the same as its unconditional probability, that 
is 
)Pr(...),Pr( 1211 tttttt PPPPPP === +−−+ . (3.16) 
 
Random walk 3 relaxes the independence assumption to accommodate processes with 
dependent but uncorrelated increments. A case in which random walk 3 will hold but not 
random walk 1 and 2 is any process where 0),( =+ktt eeCov  for all k , but where 
0),( 22 ≠+ktt eeCov  for some k, in both cases 0≠k . Though the increments are serially 
uncorrelated, they are clearly not independent as the squared increments are correlated 
(Merton, 1990; Damodaran, 1996; Campbell, 1997). 
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The main essence of the random walk model is that price the change during period t is 
independent of the sequence of price changes during previous time periods. This implies 
that chart reading is of no real value to the investor. While perfect independence can 
probably not be attained, the independence assumption is not rejected as long as the 
dependence is not above some maximum acceptable level. For statisticians the acceptable 
level can be arbitrarily set using statistical properties of distribution, while for traders the 
degree of dependence should not be sufficient to allow expected profits to be 
significantly greater than they would be under a naïve buy-and-hold strategy. It may be 
important from a statistical point of view to know that on alternate days the price of a 
stock increases by e and then decrease by e, but this sequence will not be important for a 
trader if the profits made from such a trade will not breakeven over transaction costs 
(Samuelson, 1965; Solnik, 1973). 
 
The market situation is consistent with the independence in the random walk model. It is 
assumed that at any point there exists, at least implicitly, an intrinsic worth8 for each 
security. This worth is dependent upon the company’s earning prospects, which in turn is 
related to economic, political and other factors, some of which are peculiar to the 
company and others which impact on other companies as well. The intrinsic worth can 
change over time as a result any actual, or anticipated, changes in factors that are likely to 
affect the company’s earning prospects. If successive bits of information, which has an 
impact on ‘worth,’ arise independently across time, and if noise and uncertainty 
concerning the intrinsic value does not follow any consistent pattern, then successive 
price changes of the related securities will be independent (Lo, 1997).  
 
In practice, however, noise is sometimes generated in dependent manner. In certain 
markets there exist market (opinion) leaders whose trading influences the position of 
others. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to expect dependence in the errors ( ie ) of the 
individuals’ estimates of intrinsic worth.  Also, the reason for the independence of new 
information across time is not strong. As noted by Fama (1965) “good news … tends to 
be followed more often by good news than by bad news” and vice versa; hence there may 
                                                 
8
 As defined in chapter 1 
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be dependency in either the noise generating process or in the process of generating new 
information. If a company reports a healthy financial year, it is logical to expect that the 
company has a good chance of winning bids or getting more business in general, the 
announcement of which will come to the market as more good news. This may lead to 
dependence in successive price changes (Fama, 1965; Lo, 1997). 
 
Nevertheless it is still possible to have counterbalancing mechanisms in the market that 
tend to produce the independence in price changes of shares, even if there are 
dependencies in either the information or the noise generating process. It is assumed that, 
although sometimes there are discrepancies between actual prices and intrinsic values, 
traders, in general, accept that actual prices usually tend to move toward intrinsic values 
(Fama, 1965; Lo, 1997). Take a market in which there are two forms of sophisticated 
traders: the superior fundamental analysts who are better at predicting the advent of new 
information and estimating its effects on intrinsic value than are others, and the superior 
chartists who are more adept in the statistical analysis of price behaviour than are others. 
Suppose, for argument’s sake, that a trader comes into the market who thinks that the 
share is overvalued or undervalued, he or she tends to attract other traders of like feeling 
and may cause others to change their opinions in error or impulsively. This will produce 
bubbles in the price series causing the price level to run well below or well above the 
intrinsic value. Sophisticated analysts are, however, expected to cause these bubbles to 
burst before they really get the chance to get underway. For example, those who are good 
in estimating intrinsic value now have an incentive to take positions based on their 
estimate of intrinsic value since they expect the price to eventually move back toward its 
intrinsic worth. Thus, the dependence in the noise generating process is neutralised by 
their actions (Cootner, 1962; Fama, 1965). 
 
Though fundamental analysts may not always estimate intrinsic values exactly, the 
effectiveness of their activities in erasing discrepancies can be reinforced by the existence 
of astute chartists. As long as there are important dependencies in the series of successive 
price changes, they will perform arbitrage operations which will tend to erase the 
dependences and make actual prices closer to intrinsic values. The intrinsic worth of 
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securities will therefore change only as a result of new information, that is actual and 
anticipated changes in any variable that affects the prospects of the company (Cootner, 
1962; Fama, 1965). 
 
Vagueness and uncertainty surrounding new information is still consistent with 
independence as long as there are arbitrageurs who seek to profit from any perceived 
dependence. For example, if the market tends to consistently underestimate the effects of 
new information, astute chartists will eventually learn that the market is a slow-learner 
and seek to profit from the consistent lags in the price adjustment process, thereby 
eliminating the lags (Fama, 1965; Damodaran, 1996). If the price adjustment is affected 
by vagueness but not biased in an observable direction, then prices will tend to over-
adjust as much as they will under-adjust, so they remain unpredictable (Damodaran, 
1996). 
 
4.0 Against market efficiency 
 
Empirical evidence against market efficiency can be said to be mounting. Some 
researchers who had hypothesised that markets are efficient could not find strong 
empirical evidence to support the hypothesis especially in developing and emerging 
markets. As is common with research into economics, numerous researchers have raised 
concerns on potential sampling errors, the formative nature of behavioural theories and 
other econometric concerns, while maintaining that the hypothesis is robust (See 
especially Damodaran, 1996 and Kothari, 2001).  
 
Markets do, in essence, aggregate information across heterogeneously informed traders 
more efficiently than a central planner if sufficient incentives exist to ensure that this 
aggregation process operates efficiently. The reliability of the price discovery system 
depends on the continued existence of exploitable (miss-pricing) opportunities to ensure 
that arbitrage continues to function; hence a free and competitive market is (expected to 
be of necessity) inefficient to some degree. The massive arbitrage activities present in 
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today’s securities markets attest powerfully to the continued existence of market 
imperfections on which arbitrageurs ‘feed’ (Hayek, 1945; Lee, 2001). 
 
If arbitrageurs make no profit from their ‘costly’ activity, then the assumption that 
markets are always in equilibrium is inconsistent with the assumption that markets are 
always perfectly arbitraged. Grossman et al. (1980: 393), therefore propose a model in 
which there is an “equilibrium degree of disequilibria: prices reflect information of 
informed traders (arbitrageurs), but only partially” so that those who invest in collecting 
and analysing information are compensated. Share prices convey information, making the 
information obtained by the informed traders publicly available, but the market does this 
imperfectly, for if it were to do it perfectly, an equilibrium would not exist.  
 
Grossman’s model is an extension the Noise Rational Exceptions Model (Grossman 
1978). He assumes that, on one hand, there are informed traders, who learn the 
underlying probability distribution that generates future expected prices and take 
positions based on this information. On the other hand, there are uninformed traders who 
do not invest in collecting information, but who know that the current price reflects the 
information of the informed traders.  In this model, 1,~ +tjr consists of two parts  
itj er +=+ µ1,~  where 0)( =Ε ie  (3.17) 
where µ  is observable, or at least inferable, at a cost and e is unobservable but both are 
random variables. Informed traders pay for information and so their demands are based 
on the observed µ  and the prevailing tP , but uninformed traders base their decisions on 
tP . If js  is the equilibrium supply of a security, then demand should equal supply under 
the price function ),( jsP µpi ; where pi  is the proportion of informed traders. It is assumed 
that traders cannot learn js , so the uninformed trades are prevented from learning the 
true µ  via observations of ),( jsP µpi  because they cannot distinguish between variations 
in tP  due to changes in tΦ  from variations due to changes in aggregate supply ( js ). 
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Therefore, even though ),( jsP µpi  reveals some information to the uninformed traders, it 
does not reveal all the information. 
If the quality of informed traders’ information increases, the more their demands will 
vary with information and thus the more prices will vary with µ , hence the price system 
becomes more informative. This can cause pi  either to increase or decrease because, even 
though the value of being informed has increased due to increased quality of µ , the 
utility of being uniformed has also increased, as the price system is now more 
informative.   
Lee (2001: 233) is of the view that the assumption that the price adjustment process to 
information is efficient has had an enormous, but erroneous “influence on the way we 
select research topics, design imperial tests and interpret findings.” He argues that price 
discovery is a complex process deserving more attention than the naïve view given by the 
EMH. Other researchers on the applications of the EMH in the accounting field have also 
acknowledged that “price adjustment to new information is a continuous process, and 
does not occur instantaneously” (Dyckman and Morse, 1986: 2).   
 
Markets are buffeted by a continuous flow of information, or rumours and innuendos 
disguised as information. The information received by the market is often more 
qualitative than it is quantitative. Traders have to interpret this information and derive its 
quantitative effect on risk and return, and eventually on the price of the related security. 
Traders reacting to signals and pseudo-signals9 cannot fully ascertain the extent to which 
their own signals, and information, are already reflected in the price. Traders begin to 
trade on their ‘imperfect’ information endowments and the price moves accordingly. 
Through trial and error, the aggregation process will eventually be completed and the 
price will fully reflect the impact of a particular signal. In the meantime, however, many 
new signals will arrive; causing new turbulence before the market fully adjusts to the 
previous signals (Lee, 2001; Dyckman and Morse, 1986). 
 
                                                 
9
 Pseudo-signals have the appearance, but not the substance, of information. 
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Lee (2001) gives an analogy of the sea, which is constantly trying to be level. Water 
always seeks its own level as the forces of gravity do their work; but the sea is 
continuously buffeted by winds causing tides and waves. Before the water finds its level, 
another tide is formed, and so the sea will never be like a millpond on a still summer 
night. In the same way, before a piece of information can be fully reflected in the price of 
a security, new information will arrive and the pricing process is cut midway. As a result 
markets are in a continuous state of adjustment, therefore the pertinent question on 
market efficiency should not be “yes or no because strictly speaking the answer is always 
no.” (Lee, 2001:237).  
 
The current price of a security is, at best, a noisy (or incomplete) proxy of the security’s 
true fundamental value. In this context Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989), Bernard and 
Thomas (1990) and Lee (2001), among others, suggest that our research efforts would be 
better focused on how, why, and when prices adjust (or fail to adjust) to information, the 
adjustment of which should not be assumed to be instantaneous unless otherwise proven.  
 
As mentioned earlier, many researchers have demonstrated that ‘on average’ active 
investment managers do not beat their benchmarks after management fees and this is 
often cited as the main evidence for efficiency. It seems however that this evidence has 
more bearing on the nature of capital flows than on the efficiency of financial markets. If 
active investment managers consistently beat their benchmarks after management fees 
then capital will flow from passive to active investment instruments and vice versa. In 
that sense, failure to beat the market by the average investor does not necessarily mean 
that the market is efficient (Keane, 1983).  
 
5.0 Practitioners and the EMH 
 
The efficient market hypothesis suggests that if a market is found to be efficient neither 
technical analysis nor fundamental analysis is worthwhile. Lorie and Hamilton (1973: 72) 
qualify this by adding that the analysis will only be worthwhile “if there is sound 
originality in the process of analysis.” Academics have, over the years, done much to 
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prove that stock prices move in a random and unpredictable way; hence there is no point 
to knowledgeable analysis and portfolio management. Professionals on the other hand 
know, purportedly from experience, that their expertise is by no means made obsolete by 
the fact that markets can be proved to be efficient. Since they have never had to decide on 
what to buy or sell, or had to explain an investment loss to an irate client, academics – 
and their plethora of learned journals and seminars – are considered inherently and 
eminently ‘unqualified to comment’ on real world matters (Crowell, 1977). 
 
Investment analysts are normally divided into technical analysts and fundamental 
analysts, based on their tools of investment analysis. However, most of the investors do 
not use either of the two exclusively. For example, speculators may put more emphasis 
on technical analysis, but they are at the same time mindful of the economic environment 
and the fundamentals surrounding the shares they are speculating on. On the other hand, 
long-term investors are more concerned with the macroeconomic picture, industrial 
(sectoral) prospects and company fundamentals, but as market timing is important 
technical analysis plays an important role in timing their purchases and sales (Lampen, 
2001). 
 
1.0.0 Technical analysis 
 
Technical analysis is generally defined as an approach to investment management based 
on the belief that historical market statistics (especially prices and volumes) exhibit 
regularities such that future trends in stock movement can be deduced from the data 
(Campbell et al., 1979). It is not heavily depended on financial statements, as is 
fundamental analysis. Technical analysts do not have to have fundamental information 
first; they only have to recognize movements as they occur and track them (Reilly and 
Brown, 2003). 
 
Fundamental analysis has enjoyed a good degree of acceptance, but chart reading largely 
remains “the ‘black sheep’ of the academic finance community” (Campbell et al., 
1997:43), as their trade is often placed somewhere between voodoo and astrology.  By 
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using analytical tools that are familiar to most financial economists (for example earnings 
and dividends), fundamental analysis possesses a natural bridge to the academic 
literature. On the other hand technical analysts – with their double-bottoms, head-and-
shoulders, support and resistance levels, (Russell, 2001) and many such mysterious 
relationships – continues to employ vocabulary and techniques that are somewhat foreign 
to the academic world.  
 
Academics often liken the stock market to a radio receiver with a low signal-to-noise 
ratio; there is a certain level of static that accompanies the material being broadcast. If we 
listen for an extended period, we might begin to think that the static is part of the music 
and that some of the extraneous noise is meaningful, if not the purpose of the broadcast. 
Such is thought to be the folly of the technical analyst (Crowell, 1977). 
 
Practitioners of technical analysis maintain that there is more to their trade than a simple 
definition of ‘tracking trends’. The market value of shares is determined mainly by the 
interaction of supply and demand, which in turn is determined by numerous rational and 
‘irrational’ factors. Prices do not respond only to changes in fundamental value but also 
to people’s fallacy and behaviour. For example (Russell, 2002a: 2) notes that a break 
through “recent highs or lows [often, though not always,] send the market to the races”. 
Rising prices normally excite greed, while falling prices induce fear, and sideways prices 
bring boredom and disinterest. There are many such occurrences, which send the market 
to the races or draw the market to a ‘price station’, and these are supposed to show 
themselves though the candlesticks and other trend lines on the technical analyst’s chart.  
 
The trick is to identify the stations and the races as they come then structure your trade 
accordingly. Technical analysts are convinced that stock prices [tend to] move in trends 
that persist for appreciable lengths of time. Changes in trends are, of course, caused by 
shifts in supply and demand factors and these shifts can be detected by an analysis of 
market statistics. The analysts therefore deal with probabilities and visualisations 
(statistics and sight), and what they perceive from such is what happens in the fourth 
dimension not shown on their graphs; price patterns are just the tip of the iceberg 
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(Russell, 2002c). As the fundamentalist reads the market from ‘fundamental 
information’, so does the chartist read the market from the charts. It is the experienced 
manager, whose eye is supposed to see the advent of buyers, the arrival of the sellers or 
the setting in of disinterest (Russell, 2003). To everyone else the stock market remains a 
poor teacher, giving neither guarantees nor rules of thumb.  
 
Though it may be said that a minority of investors make formal use of technical analysis 
there is a fairly wide endorsement of the philosophy underlying Chartism. Most, if not 
all, investors make special note of indices breaking barriers, continuing to rally, or 
moving sideways. For example, when an index reaches an all time low investors seem to 
be concerned more about the bottoming of the market than the fundamentals underlying 
the stocks that form the index. This might not be comprehensive and particular, but it is 
as much an application of Chartism as the detailed technical analysis of peaks and 
troughs.   
 
2.0.0 Fundamental analysis 
 
When constructing a portfolio, an asset manager goes through various stages of analysis 
and research before picking the individual shares to be included in the portfolio. The 
manager has to make sure that the portfolio is well aligned with the client’s objectives, 
risk preferences and any other qualities. It has to be noted that while an economist’s 
conceptualisation of risk preferences may reflect some of the investor’s physiological 
orientation, it is mainly based on financial and economic theory, and is therefore not all-
inclusive. It is not uncommon for an investor to choose a stock based on what the 
company represents, e.g. a black empowerment firm, rather than based on how it is 
performs. In the same way decisions can be driven by intellectual curiosity, social 
position or even the excitement and sense of adventure derived from risk-taking 
behaviour (McAlister and Pessemier, 1982). An investment manager, as a specialist in 
investments is still expected to have a comparative advantage in knowing which 
investments satisfies which goals, economic or otherwise (Lampen, 2001; Reilly and 
Brown, 2003). 
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The manager begins the management process by conducting a macroeconomic analysis 
of the markets (countries) and decides how much to invest in each of the different 
markets based on the general economic and political outlook of these markets. A strong 
relationship exists between the economy and the stock market. This relationship enables 
analysts to use various economic indicators to make their asset allocation decisions. 
Funds are allocated across broad asset classes, classes of different risks, from short-term 
‘risk free’ government securities to equities. Research has shown that the asset allocation 
up to this stage accounts for up to 90% of the difference in the total returns achieved by 
institutionally managed pension funds (Bellemere et al., 1979).  
 
Stock market analysis, in which the stock market as a whole is analysed follows, and 
after that comes the industry analysis. Analysing the cross-sectional industrial 
performance is important and necessary to uncover substantial performance differences 
among industries that will help identify profitable opportunities. Even though industries 
do not necessarily perform consistently over time, risk measures for individual industries 
are relatively stable and different across industries; they therefore provide useful insights 
to the analyst.  
 
There are performance differences across companies within most industries so company 
analysis is still necessary after industry analysis.  Companies are grouped according to 
characteristics of their expected returns, for example, growth companies, defensive 
companies, cyclical companies, and so on. Though future returns are uncertain, they are 
taken to be inferable within a probability. The probability distribution of stock returns is 
not known, but it is generally accepted that probability statements can be made using the 
central limit theorem, thus assuming that returns are normally distributed.  
 
Allocation is done between different types of companies based on the investor’s 
objectives and risk preferences. Investors with a high level of risk aversion will generally 
want to invest in defensive companies, while others with low risk aversion may invest in 
speculative companies (Damodaran, 1996; Reilly and Brown, 2003). It should be noted 
that the factors that determine the type of company and the type of stock are different, 
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which means the two are not necessarily the same – a stock from a defensive company is 
not necessarily a defensive stock. While defensive companies are those whose future 
earnings are likely to withstand an economic downturn, defensive stocks are those whose 
rate of return is not expected to decline during an overall market decline. Therefore stock 
valuation is still necessary after the company analysis.  
 
There is a strong reliance on historical stock market and accounting data in the inference 
of current and future value of shares as well as the future trade off between risk and 
return. In addition to the fact that the descriptive statistics and the methods used to make 
probabilistic statements about a stock’s expected return and risk are based on 
assumptions, they are not all inclusive. Analysts believe that there are a lot other 
qualitative characteristics about the firm that are as important as its financial state of 
affairs. These characteristics include quality of a firm’s management, its corporate 
culture, among others. They will therefore incorporate these qualitative considerations to 
either increase or decrease the calculated risk and return (Damodaran, 1996; Campbell, 
1997). 
 
The analyst will not only estimate the share’s intrinsic value (present value of expected 
dividends or future cash flows) but will also measure its relative value. Relative value is 
especially important because it allows the comparison to determine if a share is cheap or 
expensive relative to other shares or to its own historical performance.  Relative value 
measures include, Price/Book Value Ratio, Price/Cash Flow Ratio, Price/Earnings Ratio 
and other ratios (Lampen, 2001). It is logical for an investor to buy the shares that are 
perceived to be undervalued and sell overvalued shares. Nevertheless the security analyst 
will not necessarily be looking for ‘buys, holds or sells’, but for estimates of the 
parameters that describe the security’s covariance with the market index (or other 
securities) in terms of risk and return. This relationship is central to the construction of an 
efficient portfolio.  
 
Market timing is also an important aspect of portfolio construction. The manager should 
know the best time to buy the shares that he will have selected for his portfolio. After the 
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portfolio has been constructed, the portfolio manager will monitor the portfolio and 
rebalance it whenever necessary in order to maintain the desired risk level. By using 
correlation techniques, impact analysis and other testing methods, analysts infer the likely 
impact of new information, in the form of announcements and news, to a share’s risk and 
return  (Reilly and Brown, 2003). 
 
If investors believe that the market is efficient they cannot expect some stocks to perform 
better than others. As a result, they would not concentrate their funds in a single asset, but 
diversify their funds across different asset classes to create an efficient portfolio well 
hedged against risk, or rather a portfolio in line with the investor’s risk preference. A 
portfolio is considered to be efficient if no other portfolio offers higher expected returns 
with the same (or lower) risk, or lower risk with the same (or higher) return (Damodaran, 
1996).  
 
Each investor is expected maintain his/her portfolio to minimise brokerage costs, or sell 
portions thereof when he or she needs the money or to establish tax losses. The desired 
risk level can be maintained by rebalancing the portfolio whenever necessary; otherwise 
the best investment strategy will be a passive one. However a passive strategy does not in 
any way imply a random purchase of shares, but means “choosing a well diversified 
portfolio in accordance with the investor’s utility toward risk” (Seneque, 1979), such that 
there is need to determine the contribution that each security makes to the riskiness of the 
entire portfolio (Damodaran, 1996; Reilly and Brown, 2003).  
 
This process, which an asset manager goes through before deciding which stocks to buy 
or sell, is what distinguishes him or her from a roulette player. If the wheel has been 
proved to be fair, then you may not need to pay for tips on ‘How to increase your chances 
of winning’, but you will still need an analyst even though the market has been proved to 
be efficient (Seneque, 1979, Damodaran, 1996; Campbell, 1997). 
 
Today there are numerous index and hedge funds that are tailored on the basis of Modern 
Portfolio Theory. Managers of these funds seem to agree on the basic notion of the EMH 
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that the movement in stock prices is not predictable. The market is taken to be inherently 
uncertain such that asset prices, for both stocks and other securities, are expected to move 
up as much as they are expected to move down. Ironically it is because of this uncertainty 
that asset management is needed. It is professional managers who are expected to have 
the expertise needed to construct the optimum portfolios and manage them in a way that 
will minimise the risk assumed by investors.  
 
The martingale model and the random walk theory, which are used to describe the 
unpredictable behaviour of stock price changes, have their origin in the history of the 
games of chance (Campbell, 1997). When playing, one is at the mercy of chance and not 
skill; in the same way it is argued that when investing one is at the mercy of chance rather 
than expertise. Practitioners however think that the stock market is more like a fair game 
of chess than of roulette. As in an efficient market where all the information is available, 
so is the arrangement of the pieces on the board apparent to both players. Using the same 
information, one player can make a superior decision to the other; in the same way a 
practitioner can make a superior decision to other players even when they have the same 
information. It will seem unfair to say that a chess player is a consistent winner because 
of luck rather than his skill; by the same token it is apparently unfair to conclude that 
some practitioners are just lucky and not astute. The important thing is therefore not only 
the information, but also the evaluation of such and the decisions that emanate from such 
evaluation (Crowell 1979). 
 
3.0.0 Conclusion 
 
There still exists a gap between the tools of analysis which academics and practitioners 
use. On one hand academics often employ highly mathematical analysis and their 
literature is written in complicated jargon, which even their fellow academics find 
difficult to comprehend. On the other hand, practitioners employ sophisticated techniques 
as well as intuition and gut feel in their decision-making. A large portion of the research, 
which concluded that fund performances do not justify the management fees charged by 
managers, uses returns as the only measure of performance (See Lo (1997) for a 
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compilation of research on EMH). Nevertheless there is more to the market, and to 
investment, than returns per se. 
 
By nature people are risk averse and will pay to reduce risk. People buy insurance polices 
primarily for risk reduction and to insure against the unknown. Whether they get a chance 
to claim or not is a secondary issue. In the same way, having your savings in a fund 
whose objective is ‘to provide a high degree of capital stability with minimal risk of loss’ 
will give you the peace of mind you need. Thus, although numerous researchers have 
proved that this whole process of investment analysis does not contribute much, if at all, 
to net returns, investors are not prepared to risk their investments by committing them to 
non-professionals. It is actually ironic that most research on EMH gives little 
significance, if any, to risk reduction and assurance of capital preservation, but this seems 
to be at the centre of most of the managed funds. 
 
The EMH literature assumes people to be economically rational; therefore they are 
expected to learn from their mistakes, to learn profit-making techniques from others and 
to exploit any exposed market anomalies. However, people often act for reasons that are 
removed from ‘economic rationality.’  Crowell (1977) gives an extreme but cogent 
description of the market when he argues that the market is people, not stocks, and more 
often than not, the people’s fear and panic, or greed and speculation affect the stock 
market rather than the fundamentals. Their collective emotion invariably produces the 
same cycle in market prices. It follows therefore, that peoples’ behaviour is as important 
as, if not more important than, the market fundamentals. 
 
In the investment world traders work under survival pressure, and it is this pressure that 
prompts them to search for better investment strategies and forecasting models; the 
higher the pressure, the stronger the incentive to search for better strategies. It is 
generally assumed that those at the bottom have more incentive to search since they have 
more pressure that the top performers. Naturally, top performers are more confident of 
their strategies and hence have less incentive to search or change. But in a world were 
new strategies are born daily and die of old age before lunch, continuous innovation and 
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resourcefulness is crucial if one is to remain the best. The fact that no funds are 
constantly good performers will not, in this case, mean that the time they performed well 
was by chance. It means that when there was pressure to perform the funds performed 
and overtook those that had little or no pressure, and when there was no pressure to 
perform they were outperformed by those under pressure.  
 
The EMH hypothesises that if one analyst’s analysis is found to be superior to others then 
more and more analysts will adopt it until it is no longer profitable. It however seems that 
analysts not only charge for the use of ‘their’ techniques, but they are unwilling to reveal 
them. As a result, a superior strategy may be discovered but not everyone in the market 
will be able to learn it or use it. 
 
Researchers have carried out numerous studies to substantiate their claims that securities 
markets are indeed efficient. A review of the research that has been carried out on the 
subject is presented in the next chapter. The review is a selection of results that represent 
a sample of the different findings in different markets. A review of the research done on 
the JSE is presented first and is divided according to the levels of efficiency being tested. 
The remainder of the review is divided according to the markets (developed and 
developing) and then according to the three levels of efficiency (weak, semi-strong and 
strong form).  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Jensen (1978) believes that there is no other proposition in economics that has more solid 
empirical evidence supporting it than the EMH. Nevertheless a survey of the research 
carried out to date shows that although the majority of the researchers could not reject the 
EMH, empirical findings range from acceptance to complete rejection of the hypothesis. 
In essence there are varying degrees of partial, and sometimes cautioned, acceptance and 
rejection (Lo, 1997). 
 
Given that failure to prove weak form efficiency implies the failure to prove both semi-
strong and strong form efficiency, most of the research carried out has been confined to 
this ‘basic notion’ of efficiency. The weak form basically asserts that price and volume 
movements follow a random walk such that price changes are independent of prior 
movements. Thus the test for weak form efficiency is often conducted by testing for 
serial correlation or, at least, identifiable patterns in share price movements.  
 
Researchers have extended their tests to semi-strong form efficiency, which is tested 
either directly or indirectly. The direct approach tests the market’s reaction to information 
as it becomes available to the market. In an efficient market, share prices are expected to 
react instantaneously in the right direction and with the right magnitude, leaving no 
opportunity for profiting from under-reactions or over-reactions. Though the direct 
approach appears to be the best way of testing the market’s efficiency, isolating the 
extent to which a given price movement can be attributed to a particular piece of 
information is difficult, if not impossible. Even if it were possible to test the market’s 
reaction to all the available new information, it could still be agued that it is the ability to 
integrate the effect of several pieces of information that gives one investor an edge over 
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the other. Therefore knowing the effect of individual pieces of information in isolation is 
not enough unless one can deduce the combined effect of these items (Keane, 1983).   
 
Indirect tests of semi-strong form efficiency are based on the assumption that 
professional fund managers use information available to the market in their investment 
decisions. Their performance is thus measured against some yardstick such as the market 
index or a passive buy-hold strategy, which does not need an investment in gathering and 
analysing information (Reilly and Brown, 2003). The performance of professionally 
managed funds is expected to match the market, at best, and under-perform it on average, 
when management fees are incorporated.  
 
Investment managers can be broadly be classified into technical analysts and fundamental 
analysts; however fund managers rarely use either of the strategies exclusively. For this 
reason indirect tests can be viewed as testing all the forms of efficiency, because a fund’s 
performance may be attributed to astute technical analysis, superior fundamental 
techniques or even access to ‘insider’ or private information (Keane, 1983). In any case if 
fund managers do not outperform the market, then it can be said that the market is 
efficient at least in the weak and semi-strong sense since we can reasonable assume that 
investors use chartist and/or fundamental techniques in their quest to beat the market.  
 
The following sections review various empirical studies and findings on the EMH. A 
review of the research done on the JSE is presented first; thereafter the review is divided 
first according to the markets (developed and developing) and then according to the three 
levels of efficiency (weak, semi-strong and strong form).  
 
2.0 The JSE Securities Exchange 
 
1.0.0 Weak form efficiency 
 
The first research on the JSE is apparently the one by Jammine and Hawkins (1974), who 
tested for the random walk or Markovian properties over the period 1966 to 1973 using 
weekly changes in price indices. They concluded that technical analysis could be used to 
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profit since price changes did not follow a random walk. However a year later, Affleck-
Graves and Money (1975) found little evidence of autocorrelation over the period 1968 to 
1973 and concluded that the JSE is efficient in the weak sense.  
 
Gilbertson and Roux (1977) argues that the study by Affleck-Graves and Money (1975) 
should not be relied upon since the use of weekly data makes these tests inconclusive. 
They pointed out that non-random behaviour tends to decrease with the increase in the 
correlation lag. It should however be noted that Jammine and Hawkins (1974) who had 
also used weekly data, and had done their studies more or less over the same period as 
Affleck-Graves and Money (1975), found significant evidence of correlation. 
 
Haddassin (1976) concluded that both the share prices and the earnings of listed 
industrial companies were inconsistent with the random walk. Both Haddassin (1976) and 
Affleck-Graves and Money (1975) used industrial shares share prices for periods ending 
1973, though Haddasin used daily changes rather than weekly. Even though there was a 
definite correlation, the nature of the correlation was not known; therefore analysts have 
to first quantify and qualify this relationship correctly in order to earn superior returns. In 
contrast, Gilbert and Roux (1977) found out that the dependencies in share price changes 
were too small to be profitably exploited; therefore there was not enough evidence to 
reject the EMH.  
 
In 1981 Brummer and Jacobs also concluded that dependencies in price changes were too 
small to be used in predicting future prices.  Du Toit (1986) rejected the random walk 
hypothesis since about one third of the shares showed significant dependences. However, 
since the results differed from one share to another the evidence of dependence was not 
‘clear-cut’. 
 
While most of the research used serial correlation tests, runs tests and other statistical 
analysis to test for dependences, others investigated if there are any trading rules that can 
be demonstrated to perform better than a simple buy-and-hold strategy. Gillbertson and 
Roux (1977) discovered that a buy-and-hold strategy consistently outperformed the four 
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trading rules that they tested on 24 shares. Du Toit (1986) formulated a model using 
EMH and rational expectations, which tracked both ‘efficient’ prices and their systematic 
movement around systematic equilibrium prices. Returns calculated from the model were 
used as a benchmark to assess the performances of three ‘representative’ trading rules. 
While the best trading rule yielded an average return of only 8%, Du Toit’s model 
recorded an average yield of approximately 20%. The strategy was also proved to 
constantly outperform a buy-and-hold strategy. It was concluded that prices fluctuate 
around equilibrium values rather than move from one equilibrium to another. The market 
was found to be efficient for most of the time; however at times prices deviated from the 
equilibrium, presenting an opportunity for investors to profit by monitoring such 
deviations.  
 
Conclusions that can be drawn from Du Toit’s study are mixed. It can be argued that the 
market is efficient since a model based on EMH and Rational expectations earned 
superior returns. But it can also be argued that a strategy was found which consistently 
outperformed both the buy-and-hold strategy and other strategies. It can even be said that 
the study also proves that technical analysis and the EMH are not always mutually 
exclusive, as we have been made to understand.   
 
Klerck (1986) found evidence that multivariate time series analysis could be used to 
forecast share prices on the JSE. Structural changes that occur in the economy and the 
share market may cause identified relationships to be invalid, but on average “good 
results” are achieved from the forecasts (Klerck, 1986:33). 
 
Studies on most of the major stock exchanges have revealed strong January seasonality 
effect on stock returns10. Bradfield (1990) investigated the seasonality of stock returns on 
the JSE. Unlike most of the markets, the JSE had an insignificant January effect but 
showed significant July and December seasonality effects. The December effect might be 
as a result of the thin and lacklustre trading that is characteristic of the JSE during the 
month of December, which is traditionally a holiday season in South Africa. 
                                                 
10
 See Keane, 1983; Damodaran, 1996 and Lo, 1997 for an overview. 
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2.0.0 Semi-strong and strong form efficiency 
 
Knight and Affleck-Graves (1983) tested the impact of a change in the method of 
inventory valuation on share prices. They looked on 21 industrial companies, which had 
changed from FIFO to LIFO, and discovered that such a change had a negative impact on 
the share prices. They concluded that the market was inefficient since it was reacting to a 
change in accounting policy, which does not necessarily affect the firm’s prospects, and it 
did so slowly. However, in a latter paper, Knight, Affleck-Graves and Hamman (1985) 
warned that companies which change accounting policies could be conveying new 
information to the market on the management’s expectations. The perceived expectations 
and not the change in accounting policy will therefore cause the share prices to change.  
 
In another study, Knight and Affleck-Graves (1985) concluded that the market could 
anticipate poor results before the results were released, but tends to overestimate 
decreases in earnings. The earnings announcement will therefore be followed by an 
upward correction in the share price. For companies reporting good results, the reaction 
only came after the event, which means that the market was unable to forecast the good 
information. The information was factored slowly into the market prices since it took up 
to ten weeks for prices to fully adjust to the announcements.  
 
In comparing the JSE and the NYSE, it was concluded that the average JSE analyst is not 
as perceptive as his New York counterpart. In other words the NYSE is more efficient in 
the semi-strong sense than the JSE.  However, in 1987 Firer, Ward and Teeuwisse 
concluded that the level of predictive ability required to ‘beat the index’ on both the JSE 
and the NYSE was not very different. According to them the efficiency of both markets 
as well as the forecasting ability of their participants is almost the same.    
 
In the case of takeovers, significant market reaction could be detected up to 15 days 
before the announcement of the takeover and in the 5 days after the announcement date 
(Bhana, 1987). The fact that reaction continued for up to 5 days shows that the market is 
a slow learning market. Reaction before the announcement date was interpreted as 
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evidence of insider trading, though it was apparently carried out through third parties, in 
which case the market is not efficient in the strong sense.   
 
Ooms, Archer and Smit (1987) tested if traders profited from using dividend information. 
It was found that traders would not be able to earn superior returns by using dividend 
information. Though the market anticipated the news on dividends and reacted to it, the 
reaction was almost always positive irrespective of the nature of the news. The market 
was not sophisticated enough to interpret the anticipated news correctly. Sometimes 
holders of ‘bad news portfolios’ were even better off than holders of ‘good news 
portfolios’.  
 
In a study of the performance of South African unit trusts over the period 1977 –1986, 
Knight and Firer (1989) discovered that funds had an average return of almost 2% below 
the market, but the systematic risk levels of all the unit trusts were well below the market 
level. Though professionally managed funds performed worse than the market, the low 
return was compensated for by the low risk associated with these funds. Besides the fact 
that one fund was found to be the best performer in all cases, and that the same unit trusts 
performed either consistently well or consistently poorly, a significant number of funds 
outperformed the market on a risk adjusted basis. It was concluded that the JSE is 
inefficient in the semi-strong sense. Since it is not unreasonable to assume that 
consistently superior performance can be attributed to the skills of specific individuals or 
even to access to private information, this study can also be used to make conclusions 
about the strong form efficiency of the JSE.  
 
Bhana (1989, 1990) found out that share prices did not adjust efficiently to information as 
it becomes publicly available. Share prices consistently overreacted to negative events, an 
anomaly which normally remained for up to one year and was significant enough to be 
profitably exploited by astute arbitrageurs. Overreaction for positive events was not 
consistent and was normally short-lived. Page and Way (1992) had also concluded that 
there was clear evidence of long run overreaction. The overreaction was ‘corrected’ 
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mainly in the second and third years of the event which means abnormal returns could be 
achieved by constructing arbitrage portfolios for between two and three years.  
 
Bhana (1990) investigated the effectiveness of buy and sell recommendations from 
analysts and firms that provide investment advisory services. Sell recommendations 
consistently under-performed the market, suggesting that the market is efficient. However 
buy recommendations had significantly positive abnormal returns suggesting than 
recommended shares were genuinely undervalued.  It has been argued that the analyst’s 
ability to find undervalued shares might be the result of having access to superior new 
information or to private information, a factor that has a bearing not only on the semi-
strong efficiency but also on the strong form efficiency.   
 
In 1991 Bhana investigated the reaction to shifts in dividend policy for companies listed 
over the period 1970 to 1980. The study found out that large dividend changes provided 
the market with information beyond that contained in the earnings announcement and the 
market’s reaction to such announcements continued for up to 19 days after the event. 
 
Results and conclusions from these event studies should be interpreted with caution 
because it is difficult to isolate the effect of a particular event from others. The cited 
studies show that overreaction sometimes persists for up to three years. It is questionable 
if the effect of one event can still be tracked for that long given that it is difficult to 
isolate it in the first place. Also, the perceived correction might actually be the result of a 
change in perception because of new information rather than a correction of an 
overreaction. 
 
The results on the JSE are mixed but it appears that the researchers who found this 
market to be inefficient far outnumber those who found it to be efficient. In the studies by 
Strebel (1977 and 1978) more than half of the listed shares were thinly traded, a factor 
which was discovered to induce false autocorrelation in the return series. However, he 
and many other researchers did not control for the thin trading bias in their studies. It is 
not impossible that most of the correlation found was a result of thin trading. It should 
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also be noted that the JSE has, since the most of the studies, undergone a massive 
transformation, which included measures to increase information flow, and to reduce 
insider trading, and transaction costs, among other things, all of which is expected to 
improve the overall efficiency of the exchange. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume 
that the efficiency of the JSE has improved, and so it is worthwhile to test it and find out 
if the transformation improved the efficiency.    
 
3.0 Developed markets 
 
1.0.0 Weak form efficiency 
 
While the EMH was developed and proved to be theoretically robust from as early as the 
early 1900s (Bachelier, 1900 and 1914), Working’s 1934 study is normally cited as the 
first empirical study to be carried out (Keane, 1983). Since 1934, through to the early 
1970s, most of the studies carried out indicated that share price movements, over time, 
could be represented as a series of (cumulative) random numbers11. These findings led to 
the random walk hypothesis, since research (especially on the New York Stock 
Exchange) had fairly consistently demonstrated that the pattern of share price movements 
“substantially follow a random walk and that price changes are independent of prior 
movements.” (Keane 1983: 35).  
 
Alongside random walk tests, other researchers investigated whether trading strategies 
and rules designed to exploit possible systematic, or at least identifiable, patterns are 
effective. Alexander (1961) found that certain filter techniques yielded abnormal returns, 
however these returns were, to a large extent, eliminated by transaction costs. Similarly 
Fama and Blume (1966) demonstrated that even though prices do not laterally follow a 
random walk, the degree of non-randomness is insufficient for investors to trade 
profitably after transactions costs. Dryden (1970) found similar results in the UK. Latane 
and Young (1969), and Jensen and Bennington (1970) who tested other trading strategies 
                                                 
11
 See for example Kendall 1953, Roberts 1959, Granger et al. 1963, Alexander 1961, Fama 1965, and 
Dryden 1970. 
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developed to exploit price trends also concluded that no trading strategy could be 
demonstrated to outperform a simple buy and hold strategy.    
 
In 1982 Rosenberg and Rudd found no serial correlation in total returns and went on to 
test for serial correlation with respect to each of the major components of a security’s 
return. The two major components tested were the market related return and the security 
specific return. Their results showed that the market return exhibited a positive serial 
correlation while the security specific return had a negative serial correlation, a 
characteristic that resulted in an increased predictability of the total returns. Even though 
these findings suggest a violation of the weak form efficiency, the study failed to 
demonstrate the existence of exploitable efficiency since the impact of transaction costs 
was not accounted for.  
 
Most of the developed markets, especially the NYSE and the LSE, have been 
demonstrated to be efficient, at least in the weak sense. However research on some 
European markets has proved the contrary. In 1973 Solnik tested the validity of the 
random walk on the French, Germany, British, Italian, Dutch, Belgium, Swiss and 
Swedish stock markets. He concluded that deviation from random walk was “more 
apparent in the European stock price behaviour than in the American stock prices.” 
(Solnik 1973: 1158). With the exception of the LSE where prices behaved much like the 
US stock prices, all the other markets exhibited some dependence in the price 
movements.  
 
Generally, the serial correlation coefficients for various indices were found to be too 
small to have any significance from an investor’s point of view. However, the serial 
correlation coefficients for individual stocks were found to be fairly stable over time; this 
means that astute investors could profit by exploiting existing time dependencies on a 
stock-by-stock basis. This could not be done for the market as a whole since market 
coefficient signs did not exhibit significant systematic patterns. Daily stock price changes 
were found to be significantly predictable, but prohibitive daily transactions costs limited 
the use of strategies aimed at exploiting this deviation from random walk.  These 
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departures from the random walk resulted mainly from: loose requirements for disclosure 
of information, lack of control on insider trading, thin markets, and discontinuity of 
trading, which were characteristic of the European stock markets then (Solnik 1973). 
 
2.0.0 Semi-strong and strong form efficiency 
 
Ball and Brown (1968) investigated the impact of earnings announcements on the market 
prices of 261 United States firms during the period 1957 – 1965. Though the primary 
objective of the research was to evaluate the usefulness of accounting earnings in 
establishing market prices, the results demonstrate the efficiency of the New York stock 
market in the semi-strong sense. Their results showed that throughout the 12 months 
preceding earnings announcement, the share prices moved progressively in the same 
direction as that of the subsequent earning changes. In addition as much as 85 – 90% of 
the price adjustment was completed by the announcement date. This can be taken to 
indicate that the market made effective use of additional sources of information to 
forecast prices. Therefore while earnings data is apparently relevant for security pricing it 
could not be used for profitable trading as it was already substantially reflected in share 
prices.  
 
The research by Ball and Brown (1968) was only concerned with the direction of the 
price movements, but later research by Beaver, Clarke and Wright (1979) indicated that 
price changes were also quite sensitive to the magnitude of change in earnings. The 
market’s forecasting power was further reinforced by the findings by Beaver, Lambert 
and Morse (1980), who discovered that prices reflect the estimate of future earnings, 
making Price/ Earning ratios the best signals of the most likely changes in future 
earnings.  
 
It has been submitted that the fact that the announcement date is known in advance, and 
that the market can make good inferences from published results of similar companies, 
pre-empts any surprise element from a company’s announcement (Keane 1983). Fama et 
al. (1969) therefore investigated the response of share prices to share splits, in a bid to 
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focus on the impact of ‘cleaner, less predictable’ events. Though a stock split per se 
might appear not to have any economic significance, it is a signal of the management’s 
confidence on the future prospects of the company and is therefore associated with future 
fundamental economic phenomena. Fama et al. (1969) initially demonstrated that stock 
splits are a consistent forerunner of an ‘above average’ dividend increase. They then 
discovered that the market’s adjustments to reflect these potentially favourable signals 
were complete around the announcement date, thereby preventing traders from profiting 
from the availability of such information.    
 
Dann et al. (1977) tested the speed of market reaction to large block trades. It was 
assumed that the market would consider the initiator of a block transaction as having 
special information. Even though block trades were found to have an effect on prices, it 
was found that investors would have to act within five minutes of such a transaction 
being placed in order to earn a return sufficient to cover transaction costs. Trading from 
the knowledge of the block trade a day after the event will not be profitable, even before 
transaction costs. Similarly, Keown and Pinkerton (1981) discovered that the market’s 
reaction to announcement of mergers was virtually complete within the same day, any 
delay until the following day being attributable to the fact that the announcement was 
made after the market had closed. 
 
There is an overwhelmingly general consensus among researchers, especially in the US 
market, that the stock market is efficient in the weak and semi-strong sense such that 
portfolio managers cannot consistently outperform the market. Most of the indirect tests 
performed revealed that, by and large, professionally managed funds fail to outperform a 
passive buy-hold strategy. If one manages to do so it will be more from chance and luck 
than from consistently superior investment decisions.  
 
Sharpe (1966) discovered that even though the average US mutual fund portfolio 
performs as well as the Dow Jones industrial average index, the returns actually obtained 
by the holder of mutual fund shares falls short of those from the portfolio which tracks 
the Dow Jones industrial average. Jensen (1968) later concluded that US mutual funds on 
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average were unable to outperform a purely passive strategy; in fact after management 
fees most of the funds underperformed a passive strategy. Of the 115 mutual funds that 
he examined none was able to perform better than could be expected from random 
chance. According to Chang and Lewellen (1984), neither skilful market timing, nor 
clever security selection abilities, are ‘evident in abundance.’ These results are consistent 
with Elton et al. (1983) and Malkiel’s (1995) conclusions that US mutual funds do not 
earn enough to justify their information costs.    
 
Other research however proved that the investment manager is worth his/her dues. Cheng 
and Deets (1971) and Jennings and Ellison (1971) demonstrated that a rebalancing 
strategy in portfolio investment would work better than a ‘buy and hold’ strategy. These 
results are in line with Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980) assertion that informed traders are 
compensated for their information gathering. Chevalier (1999) conducted a study to 
ascertain whether there is a relation between the fund’s performance and the fund 
manager’s characteristics. Managers were grouped according to the undergraduate 
institutions they attended, and it was demonstrated that managers who attended 
undergraduate institutions with higher composite SAT scores had achieved systematically 
higher risk-adjusted returns. Their performance remained superior even after adjusting 
for behavioural differences between managers as well as selection bias.  
 
These results are in line with Ricardo’s (2002) findings on Italian equity funds. Although 
the performances of funds, net of management fees, were not significantly different from 
zero, gross returns were almost always positive. Excess returns before management fees 
remain significant even when benchmarks that take into account non-equity investments 
are used. Both Ricardo (2002) and Deaves (2003) noted that while fund managers would, 
most of the time, limit their losses through stop loss strategies, a passive strategy would 
not. 
Chang (2003) examined the performance of US mutual funds from 1992 –1996 and 
concluded that passive index funds performed better than actively managed funds. Low 
beta funds outperformed high beta funds, a result which he attributed to the fact that 
aggressive growth (high beta) funds usually charge higher fees than low beta funds. In 
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Canada, Deaves (2003) found that an average fund manager’s portfolio, after accounting 
for management expenses, underperformed risk-adjusted benchmarks. However, from his 
findings it was clear that the manager’s analysis and trading activities makes a positive 
contribution to the portfolio’s performance.  
 
Most of the literature and research on market efficiency focus more on weak and semi-
strong form efficiency rather than strong form efficiency. This is mainly because the 
strong form efficiency seems to be more concerned with the disclosure efficiency of the 
information market than with the pricing efficiency of the securities market. Also, the 
argument for strong form efficiency is not strong since intuition suggests that prices 
cannot capture new information before it is published. In any case, market participants 
and regulation authorities regard the market as inefficient in the strong sense hence 
insider trading is illegal. Therefore, for investors who are unable to, and prohibited from, 
using insider information, the important issue is whether the information, once released, 
will be fully and instantaneously captured into the share prices; thus weak form and semi-
strong form efficiency are of more practical value than the strong form.   
 
4.0 Developing and emerging markets 
 
Most of the stock markets in emerging and developing economies have been 
demonstrated to be inefficient even in the weak sense. Significant levels of inefficiency 
have been found in markets such as Singapore, India, Nigeria, Mauritius and Greece, 
among others; the inefficiency often arising from size of markets, thinness of trading and 
quality of information disclosure (Keane, 1983; Mlambo, 2003). 
 
Mecagni and Sourial (1999) looked at the Egyptian Stock Exchange and found that the 
four best-known daily indices exhibited significant departure from the EMH. There was a 
tendency for returns to display both volatility clustering and excess kurtosis. Reasons for 
inefficiency cited included, but were not limited to: limited provision, and inefficient 
dissemination, of information on performance of listed companies, the limited role of 
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professional financial intermediaries and restrictions in the trading process which makes 
this market a thinly traded market. 
 
Stock returns on the Port Louis Stock Exchange of Mauritius exhibited strong 
autocorrelation. Bundoo (2000) suggested that this could be evidence of time varying risk 
premiums or just the trading. For some researchers thin trading, which makes most of the 
shares ‘illiquid’, was cited as a cause of inefficiency, but for others it was a reason to 
treat the results with caution. Osei (2002) highlighted thinness of trading as a 
shortcoming to be considered in adopting the results that the Ghana Stock Exchange is 
inefficient. In 2001 Chiwira found the Zimbabwean Stock Exchange to be efficient in the 
weak sense, but Smith and Jefferis (2002) and Magnusson and Wydick (2002) could not 
accept the weak form efficiency hypothesis for the same market only a year latter.   
 
Hall and Urga (2002: 3) pointed out that “it is not unrealistic to suppose that [markets in 
transitional economies] start from an inefficient status and move toward an efficient 
behaviour.”  They therefore use a time varying parameter model, which can move from 
an indicator of inefficiency to efficiency (or vice versa), to assess the efficiency of the 
Russian stock market between September 1995 and March 2000. For the most liquid 
stocks, the market is initially inefficient, but it took around two and a half years to 
become efficient. For all the other shares, the overall performance of the market remained 
predictable over most of the time but there is evidence of tendency toward ongoing 
efficiency in the last period.   
 
Mlambo, Biekpe and Smit (2003) investigated the random walk behaviour of stock 
returns on four African stock markets: Egypt, Kenya, Morocco and Zimbabwe. On all 
four markets, the hypothesis that stock returns are normally distributed was rejected. 
Almost half of the stocks on each of the four markets showed significant positive serial 
correlation and there was therefore not enough evidence to accept the hypothesis of a 
random walk.  Mlambo et al. (2003) adjusted the returns for thin-trading effect, but the 
results continued to show significant departure from the EMH.  
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This research uses the traditional methodologies in testing the behaviour of stock returns. 
The methodology and data used are detailed in the next chapter. This includes the 
measurement of variables as well as the derivation of the models used to measure the 
variables.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Researchers have looked at the question of Market Efficiency in various ways and 
analysed it using different models. The hypothesis has been tested using different 
statistical techniques and in different markets over different time periods. The volume of 
research in this area has led to numerous advances in both theoretical modelling and 
statistical analysis surrounding the EMH. However despite all these advances it still 
appears that the EMH is not yet empirically well defined.  
 
The statement that prices ‘fully reflect’ all the available information is theoretically 
robust, but to make it empirically operational one has to specify the process of price 
formation in a model form. Assuming that equilibrium conditions can be specified in 
terms of expected returns, investors should not earn excess returns over time. Individual 
investors may sometimes earn excess returns but these returns should neither be earned 
consistently, nor be expected. In addition, successive returns are independent of each 
other; therefore investors cannot infer or estimate future returns from current or previous 
returns. Investigating whether successive returns are serially correlated is ‘traditionally’ 
used to test independence, in which case it is assumed that dependent price changes are 
serially correlated while independent returns are not. 
 
The empirically testable model of EMH includes too many assumptions such that the 
ultimate test for EHM here becomes a “test for several ancillary hypotheses as well” (Lo, 
1997: xvii). It is often argued that the rejection of such a joint hypothesis tells us little 
about which aspect of the joint hypothesis are we actually rejecting.  
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2.0 The analysis 
 
This paper sets out specifically to investigate the weak form efficiency of the JSE. 
Autocorrelation analysis is used to test whether period-to-period price changes follow a 
random walk, thus testing if the JSE is efficient in the weak sense. As such it investigates 
the returns from specific shares over time. 
 
1.0.0 Returns 
 
If tR  denotes the one period return realized from holding a stock and, 
1)( −−+= tttt PDPR     (5.1) 
where tP  and 1−tP  are the share prices at time t  and 1−t  respectively, and tD  is the 
dividend received at time t , then in a weak form efficient market tR is not correlated to 
ktR −  at all lags, that is  
0),cov( =
−ktt RR  0≠k    (5.2)  
 
Affleck-Graves and Money (1975) suggests that, for the purposes of correlation analysis, 
the difference between the log of prices, rather than the prices themselves, be used 
because actual price changes have a magnitude bias; a ten-cent increase on a share 
initially priced at twenty cents is not similar to a ten-cent increase on a share initially 
priced at a thousand cents. Also if tP  is invested at a return of r with continuous 
compounding for k periods then  
rk
tkt ePP =+     (5.3) 
in one period it will be  
r
tt ePP =+1     (5.4) 
from the above identity it follows that, 
t
tr
P
P
e 1+=     (5.5) 
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and 
)ln()ln( 1
t
tr
P
P
e +=    (5.6) 
so 
)ln()ln( 1 tt PPr −= +    (5.7) 
hence )ln()ln( 1 tt PP −+ is the one period yield with continuous compounding (Campbell et 
al., 1997).  
tr , which is the one period return in period t, is therefore measured as  
)ln()ln( 1−−+= tttt PDPr    (5.8) 
 
Prices are adjusted for stock splits, such that if there is a stock split of two for one at time 
t  then,   
( ) )ln()(2ln 1−−+= tttt PDPr     (5.9)  
and   
tttt PDPr ln)ln( 111 −+= +++    (5.10) 
 
2.0.0 Thin trading bias 
 
Frictions in the trading process in most of the emerging markets may cause true returns to 
differ from estimated returns; also some periods may show a zero return as a result of the 
stock not having been traded in that period. Cohen et al. (1983) suggests that whenever 
the structure of stock returns is examined in the presence of thin trading, adjustments 
should be made to control for thin trading. Some researchers (Shanken, 1987) have 
controlled for thin trading by just eliminating the thinly traded stocks. Others (Maynes 
and Ramsey, 1993; Kalluniki and Martikainen, 1997) estimated the returns for the 
missing days, they then ‘lumped’ these returns and assigned them to the day when a trade 
finally took place and set the returns for all the no-trade days to zero. The lumped returns 
approach does not prevent the false autocorrelation, which is caused by the prevalence of 
zeros during the non-traded periods. 
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Bowie (1994) discovered that returns realised after long periods of non-trading are 
higher, in absolute value (whether negative or positive) than those realised during periods 
of continuous trading. He therefore argues that control for thin trading should not only 
prevent the false autocorrelation but should also account for the price-age at the end of a 
long period of inactivity.  
 
Atchison et al. (1987) used the uniform return procedure, which allocates returns equally 
over the days in the multi-day interval if the stock is not traded, that is, if: 
)ln()ln(
tKtttkt PDPr −−+=    (5.11) 
where: 
ktr is the observed return at time t , given that there was trade in period t  
tK is the length of time between a trade in period t  and previous successive trade 
tK is measured in trading periods  
 
then 
kt
t
t rK
r
1
~
=      (5.12) 
This approach is based on the assumption that multi-period returns are a sum of one 
period returns, and thinly traded stocks make a once-off adjustment at the time trading 
takes place. The assumption also implies that these returns are of the same sign, for if 
they were of different signs they would have cancelled out each other. 
 
While Atchison et al.’s (1987) adjustment will control for the price age and also ensures 
that the time interval over which returns are measured remains the same, it still produces 
an artificial positive autocorrelation in the return series. Mlambo et al. (2003) suggests 
that if a stock is traded after, say, 14 days of inactivity then a single entry of  
))ln()(ln(1
tKttt
t
PDP
K −
−+    (5.13) 
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should be used instead of 15 entries equal value. The number of observations will then 
vary from stock to stock depending on how thinly traded each stock is; there will be less 
observations for thinly traded stocks.  
 
In this thesis thin trading is controlled for as suggested by Atchison et al. (1987), and 
modified by Mlambo et al. (2003). r is therefore measured by the expression 5.13. 
  
In addition to adjusting for thin trading, a longer time horizon of weekly returns (instead 
of daily returns) is used. A longer time horizon will increase the chances of a trade taking 
place thereby reducing the number of returns that need to be adjusted for thin trading. 
Also, given that transaction costs for daily trading might be prohibitive, dependence of 
daily prices may not be of much use to the average investor. 
 
3.0.0 Normality tests 
 
Serial correlation tests are based on the assumption that stock returns are normally 
distributed; therefore it is necessary to investigate the extent to which the data series 
approximates a normal distribution. Normality tests were performed using the skewness, 
the kurtosis and the Jarque-Bera statistic.  
 
Skewness is a measure of asymmetry of the distribution of the series around its mean. 
Skewness is computed as: 
3
1 ˆ
1
∑
Ν
=





 −
Ν
=
i
i rrS
σ
    (5.14) 
where σˆ  is based on the biased estimator for the variance and N is the number of 
observations (Bickel and Doksum, 1977: 388). The skewness of a symmetric distribution, 
such as the normal distribution, is zero. Positive skewness means that the distribution has 
a long right tail and negative skewness implies that the distribution has a long left tail.  
 
 69 
Kurtosis measures the peakedness or flatness of the distribution of the series. It is 
computed as: 
4
1 ˆ
1
∑
Ν
=





 −
Ν
=
i
i rrK
σ
    (5.15) 
where the variables are the same as above (Bickel and Doksum, 1977). The kurtosis of 
the normal distribution is 3. If the kurtosis exceeds 3, the distribution is peaked 
(leptokurtic) relative to the normal; if the kurtosis is less than 3, the distribution is flat 
(platykurtic) relative to the normal.  
  
The Jarque-Bera (JB) is a statistic for testing whether the series is normally distributed. 
The test statistic measures the difference of the skewness and kurtosis of the series with 
those from the normal distribution. The test statistic is computed as: 






−+
−
=
22 )3(
4
1
6
KSkNJB   (5.16) 
where S is the skewness, K is the kurtosis, and k represents the number of estimated 
coefficients used to create the series (Bickel and Doksum, 1977). The observed 
probability is the possibility that a Jarque-Bera statistic exceeds (in absolute value) the 
observed value under the null hypothesis of normal distribution; a small probability value 
leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis of a normal distribution.  
 
4.0.0 Correlation tests 
 
In an efficient market the share price tP  is just as likely to rise as it is to fall, hence the 
best estimator of 1+tP is tP  such that  
11 ++ += ttt PP ε  where ),0(~ 2σε Νt  (5.17) 
and tε is not correlated to kt−ε  for all 0≠k . 
 
For random walk without drift, the returns would be a white noise process in the form 
ttr ε≅
~
       (5.18) 
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where  
( ) 0)(),(cov =+ktt rgrf  .   (5.19) 
 
If ttr ε≅~  (4.17), then 
( ) 0)(),(cov =+ktt gf εε    (5.20) 
 
For the excess return tε  the serial correlation coefficient for lag k is given by: 
( )( )
( )∑
∑
−
=
−
=
−
−
−
−−
== kn
t
t
kn
t
ktt
t
ktt
k
1
2
1
)var(
),cov(
εε
εεεε
ε
εερ  (5.21) 
In this research kρ  is calculated for 1ρ  up to 10ρ . 
 
The hypothesis to be tested will therefore be 
0:0 =Η kρ  (Efficient market) 
0:1 ≠Η kρ  (Inefficient market) 
 
If the serial correlation coefficients are significantly different from zero, then we reject 
the hypothesis that prices changes follow a random walk. The test is conducted at 5% 
level of significance. 
  
It must be stressed at this point that while non-zero correlation implies dependence, zero 
correlation per se does not mean total independence. These tests can only reveal the 
presence or absence of serial correlation, not strict statistical dependence. However, both 
zero correlation and independence imply that no linear function can be used to predict 
future prices.  
 
The random walk model states that: 
( ) 0)(),(cov =+ktt rgrf     (5.22) 
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but only random walk 3 restricts )(⋅f and )(⋅g to linear functions. If )(⋅f and )(⋅g  are 
unrestricted i.e. they can assume even non-linear forms, and 5.22 still holds, then the 
return distribution also follow random walk 1 and 2. This study tests if successive returns 
are linearly correlated therefore )(⋅f and )(⋅g  are restricted to linear functions, that is 
only random walk 3 is tested, and so extra tests have to be performed find out if returns 
follows random walk 1 and 2.   
 
From the FTSE/ JSE Africa Index Series, the All Share and the Top 40 indices are used 
in trend analysis. The kind of analysis done here can only detect simple trends; higher 
order correlation can be tested for using autocorrelation tests. The analysis of indices will 
be used to draw inferences on the efficiency of the stock market over time. 
  
3.0 The Data 
 
Weekly closing prices and trading volumes from the week ending 01 January 1999 to 
week ending 25 July 2003 are used to calculate the continuously compounded returns 
used in this analysis. Basic and General Industrial Economic Sectors’ shares are used in 
the analysis, the list of which is provided in Appendix 1. The raw data on the share prices 
and trading volumes is not included in the appendix because it is too voluminous. 
 
Shares listed on the JSE are grouped according to economic sectors. The sectors, which 
include Resources, Basic Industrials, General Industrials, Financials and Development 
Capital, among others, are further divided into sub sectors.  Basic Industrials has four 
sub-sectors, which are: Chemicals, Forestry & Paper, Steel & Other Metals, and 
Construction & Building Materials.  General Industrials consists of: Diversified 
Industrials, Electronic & Electrical Equipment, and Engineering & Machinery. The 
shares are also grouped according to market capitalisation; there is the Top 40, the Mid 
Cap and the Small Cap. Even within sectors shares are further grouped according to 
market capitalisation into indices such as: Resources 20, Industrial 25 and Financial 15 
among others.  
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Although the stocks used in this study are chosen from only two sectors, they are a fair, 
though not perfect, representation of the stocks listed on the JSE in terms of frequency of 
trading, Price/Earning ratios, firm size and even the age of firms (See Appendix A-1). 
Most of the previous studies used only shares of firms with large market capitalisations 
and/or high frequency of trading. 
 
The All Share index (January 1992 to July 2003) and the Top 40 Companies Index 
(January 1996 to July 2003) were also used in the analysis. Weekly data for indices was 
not available for periods before 1997; therefore monthly closing indices, which were 
available, are used. The All Share index is a weighted index for all the shares listed on 
the JSE, the weighting of which is according to market capitalisation. The Top 40 is a 
weighted index of the Top 40 companies according to market capitalisation. Companies 
continuously move up into the top 40 or drop out of the top 40 depending on their share 
prices, so the composition of the Top 40 is dynamic.  
 
Many of the previous studies have used only indices, but this study uses stock returns for 
the individual companies in addition to indices. Index returns are an average of many 
returns; they therefore tend to average out correlations that might exist in the individual 
stock returns. Also in many developing markets, including the JSE, trade is concentrated 
on some stocks which normally have a heavy weighting in the market index, in which 
case the index will show little of the characteristics of the less frequently traded stocks. It 
is therefore not enough to use indices alone. However there still remains a need to use 
indices for the very reason that they summarise the market and present an overall picture. 
 
The data on share prices, trading volumes and indices was obtained from the Reuters 
News and Information Service Database. Information on the share classification, listing 
dates, Price/ Earning ratios and market capitalisation was obtained from Profile Data. 
 
The findings of this research and the interpretation of these findings are presented in the 
next chapter. A discussion of the results is also given but the conclusions are left for the 
final chapter.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Initially the normality of the data was examined. Thereafter serial correlation tests were 
employed to determine whether changes in stock returns on the JSE follow a random 
walk. Finally graphical analysis is also employed to test the relevance of technical 
analysis on JSE stocks. In the discussion of results reference is made to the situation in 
other African Markets. 
 
2.0 Normality tests 
The normality tests results are presented in table 6.1 below. 
 
Table 6.1 Normality tests 
Companies  
 
 Observations 
 
 Standard 
Deviation 
 Skewness 
 
 Kurtosis 
 
 Jarque-Bera 
 
 Probability 
 
 
AECI 239 0.0587 -0.255914 11.60259 739.5701 0  
AFGLASS 208 0.0605 1.041665 15.10808 1308.197 0  
AFROX 239 0.0446 0.590387 4.776963 45.32859 0  
ALTECH 239 0.0433 0.041803 3.89175 7.988661 0.01842  
ALTRON 235 0.0463 0.386684 7.62444 215.2555 0  
ARGENT 121 0.0573 0.301282 3.530063 3.247088 0.197199  
AVENG 208 0.0496 0.038864 5.361509 48.38397 0  
BASREAD 235 0.1132 0.383093 8.708527 324.8319 0  
BELL 238 0.0811 0.702583 6.773318 160.7732 0  
BICAF 31 0.0856 0.064592 5.411869 7.535327 0.023106  
BUILDMAX 124 0.2409 1.044657 5.909666 66.2955 0  
CASHBUILD 228 0.0803 -0.166613 6.343587 107.2608 0  
CEMENCO 83 0.1115 -0.182145 7.944887 85.0218 0  
CERAMIC 236 0.0317 0.216431 6.980799 157.669 0  
CHEMSERVE 236 0.0406 0.286644 7.251494 180.9713 0  
CONCOR 208 0.0745 0.599606 6.080969 94.73084 0  
CONTROL 238 0.0883 -0.010804 6.785775 142.1312 0  
COPI 152 0.0305 -0.078687 6.340046 70.81093 0  
DAWN 237 0.0825 0.298052 4.459598 24.54695 0.000005  
DELTA 238 0.0386 0.388106 4.757813 36.61642 0  
DIGICOR 237 0.1157 0.457784 6.099551 103.1491 0  
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ELBGROUP 233 0.0812 -7.856191 96.76574 87752.58 0  
GRINTEK 239 0.0786 -0.083109 3.52883 3.060097 0.216525  
GROUP_501 238 0.0728 -0.463457 6.526041 131.8137 0  
HIVELD 239 0.0619 0.264144 4.821758 35.82898 0  
HOWDEN 194 0.0775 0.294716 7.329291 154.3124 0  
HUDACO 214 0.0401 1.017291 7.507554 218.08 0  
ILAD 238 0.0874 0.153773 6.569302 127.2755 0  
IMPERIAL 84 0.0383 0.017765 3.448001 0.706886 0.702266  
INVICTA 224 0.0699 2.11456 16.01451 1747.787 0  
ISCOR 239 0.0911 1.200935 9.681653 502.0341 0  
IST 239 0.1002 0.47203 5.673332 80.04461 0  
ITLTILE 202 0.0303 0.621407 6.150746 96.5542 0  
JASCO 239 0.1345 0.742666 8.012655 272.1903 0  
KAIROS 213 0.2639 0.170328 6.733069 124.7102 0  
M_R_HLD01 239 0.0614 -0.408207 5.101986 50.6369 0  
MASNITE 159 0.1689 -10.38837 123.6558 99305.44 0  
MONTE 45 0.0496 -1.744635 15.3529 308.9423 0  
NEI_AFR01 113 0.0714 1.924 13.87963 627.0251 0  
OMNIA 230 0.0593 2.581344 22.48699 3894.629 0  
PASDEC 127 0.1289 0.588204 6.213809 61.97867 0  
PPC 239 0.0409 0.668779 5.294745 70.25521 0  
REUNET 239 0.0552 -1.928283 19.44958 2842.722 0  
SAPPI 239 0.0649 0.394871 6.837825 152.8863 0  
SEKUNJALO 85 0.1077 0.776481 7.489477 79.92514 0  
SETHOLD 234 0.1711 1.052525 11.18114 695.7827 0  
SPNJAARD 48 0.5197 6.490072 44.09088 3713.889 0  
WBHO 238 0.0511 0.771993 6.868331 172.0331 0  
YORKCOR 55 0.1021 1.935335 13.42262 283.2802 0  
 
 
Of the 48 stocks tested only six had a skewness value of less than 0.1 and only four 
stocks had a kurtosis of less than four; nevertheless they were all leptokurtic; they are 
more peaked relative to normal. Only three stocks had a probability of more than 0.05 
that their Jarque-Bera statistic exceeds the observed value. Four other stocks had 
probabilities greater than 0.01 but the remainder had probabilities of zero (rounded off to 
the nearest five decimals). 
 
The normality assumption was rejected for all the stocks returns except one (Imperial). 
Bekaert and Campbell (2002), Mlambo et al. (2003), among others, also concluded that 
emerging market returns are not normally distributed. Even in developed markets stock 
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returns have been found to be either leptokurtic or platykurtic (Kendall, 1953; Moore, 
1962 and Fama, 1965). 
  
Mlambo et al. (2003) suggests that when there is a strong deviation from normality, 
correlation analysis should be done using nonparametric testing methods, such as the runs 
test, since they do not assume a specific distribution. However, according to Kendall 
(1948) and Moore (1962), despite leptokurtosis and skewness, near normality can still be 
assumed for the sake of statistical analysis, as long as the number of observations is large. 
Mlambo et al. (2003) actually went on to perform parametric serial correlation tests even 
though the normality assumption had been rejected, the justification being that these tests 
“[help] in detecting the presence of higher order serial correlation which is difficult to 
detect by merely using the runs tests” Mlambo et al. (2003; 28). For the same reason 
serial correlation tests are conducted in this study. 
 
3.0 Correlation tests 
 
The results of the correlation tests are presented in table 6.2 and 6.3. 
   
Table 6.2 Autocorrelation coefficients of tir   
Companies            Lags           
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
AECI  -0.093 -0.114 0.025 0.023 -0.037 -0.055 0.099 -0.035 -0.088 -0.030 
AFGLASS  -0.048 -0.093 0.055 -0.120 0.013 0.141* -0.005 -0.095 0.023 -0.062 
AFROX  -0.084 -0.027 0.049 -0.045 -0.076 0.019 0.005 -0.059 -0.139 -0.036 
ALTECH  0.089 -0.071 -0.064 -0.110 -0.027 0.005 -0.115 0.023 0.113 0.112 
ALTRON  -0.022 -0.112 0.090 0.081 -0.058 -0.006 -0.053 0.022 -0.133* 0.063 
ARGENT  -0.179 -0.057 0.010 0.057 -0.017 -0.076 0.007 0.098 0.012 -0.161 
AVENG  -0.013 -0.195* -0.013 0.031 -0.023 -0.090 0.019 0.084 0.089 -0.036 
BASREAD  -0.052 0.019 -0.146* -0.053 -0.004 0.171* 0.006 0.069 -0.005 -0.083 
BELL  -0.152* -0.182* 0.110 0.026 0.060 -0.007 0.016 -0.030 0.023 0.079 
BICAF  -0.199 0.111 0.133 -0.092 -0.067 0.188 -0.253 0.049 -0.126 -0.182 
BUILDMAX  -0.223* -0.203* 0.135 -0.005 -0.055 0.104 -0.046 -0.056 -0.048 -0.028 
CASHBUILD  0.127 -0.038 -0.012 -0.042 0.012 0.121 0.046 0.085 0.078 0.097 
CEMENCO  -0.179 -0.022 -0.162 0.002 -0.023 0.138 -0.035 -0.065 -0.325* 0.069 
CERAMIC  -0.098 0.000 0.022 -0.050 -0.082 -0.015 -0.035 -0.026 -0.103 0.019 
CHEMSERVE  -0.017 -0.002 0.043 -0.123 -0.057 -0.049 0.063 -0.020 0.092 -0.032 
CONCOR  0.167* 0.010 0.110 -0.088 0.061 -0.029 -0.053 0.011 0.062 -0.032 
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CONTROL  -0.035 -0.052 0.059 -0.122 -0.086 -0.028 0.002 0.122 -0.066 0.008 
COPI  -0.072 0.043 0.051 -0.029 -0.119 0.080 0.083 0.025 -0.012 0.070 
DAWN  -0.135* 0.064 -0.010 -0.189* 0.082 -0.135* 0.030 -0.043 -0.051 0.102 
DELTA  -0.010 -0.025 0.111 0.029 0.044 -0.139* -0.005 -0.081 -0.072 -0.065 
DIGICOR  -0.262* -0.015 -0.007 0.088 -0.087 -0.046 0.121 -0.029 0.015 -0.103 
ELBGROUP  0.028 -0.015 -0.058 -0.079 -0.056 0.031 0.012 0.101 -0.020 -0.006 
GRINTEK  -0.168* -0.003 0.158* 0.037 -0.025 0.028 0.009 0.030 -0.002 -0.036 
GROUP_501  -0.129 -0.010 -0.065 -0.007 -0.039 0.169* 0.011 0.017 -0.104 0.154* 
HIVELD  -0.135* 0.080 -0.162* 0.023 -0.037 0.014 -0.028 -0.025 0.020 -0.122 
HOWDEN  -0.045 -0.103 -0.087 -0.006 -0.019 -0.012 0.003 -0.065 0.053 0.028 
HUDACO  0.028 0.039 -0.031 -0.049 0.006 -0.107 0.049 -0.070 -0.033 0.066 
ILAD  -0.147* -0.107 -0.044 0.109 -0.183* -0.029 0.035 -0.189* 0.098 0.175* 
IMPERIAL  -0.230* 0.197* -0.027 0.044 0.047 0.010 0.009 -0.153 0.095 -0.287* 
INVICTA  -0.218* 0.056 -0.036 -0.051 0.016 -0.011 0.042 -0.038 0.087 0.004 
ISCOR  0.037 -0.036 0.002 0.024 -0.008 0.006 -0.067 0.046 0.154* 0.059 
IST  -0.127 0.155* -0.078 0.028 -0.037 0.128 -0.039 0.058 -0.003 0.091 
ITLTILE  0.201* 0.021 -0.021 -0.111 -0.048 0.012 0.078 -0.016 -0.090 0.009 
JASCO  -0.032 -0.066 0.070 -0.015 -0.078 0.114 -0.065 0.026 0.072 -0.038 
KAIROS  -0.289* -0.116* -0.028 0.004 0.042 0.005 -0.068 0.031 -0.023 -0.017 
M_R_HLD01  -0.106 0.118 -0.089 -0.063 0.037 0.009 0.037 -0.059 -0.033 -0.005 
MASNITE  0.016 -0.091 0.032 0.001 -0.002 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.004 
MONTE  -0.005 0.039 -0.037 -0.030 0.062 -0.363* 0.119 -0.075 -0.017 0.002 
OMNIA  -0.066 0.163* -0.024 0.089 -0.003 0.025 -0.054 0.049 -0.001 -0.013 
PASDEC  -0.164 -0.088 -0.044 0.063 -0.059 -0.111 0.130 0.025 -0.033 -0.085 
PPC  -0.031 -0.059 -0.077 -0.067 0.033 0.041 0.049 -0.080 -0.002 -0.096 
REUNET  -0.145* -0.011 -0.130* -0.072 0.019 0.024 -0.027 0.072 0.001 -0.027 
SAPPI  -0.079 -0.048 0.05 -0.027 0.062 -0.043 -0.035 0.063 0.003 -0.098 
SEKUNJALO  -0.167 -0.103 0.098 0.147 -0.253* 0.121 0.007 0.000 -0.050 -0.007 
SETHOLD  -0.263* -0.033 0.006 -0.085 0.124 -0.003 -0.080 0.030 -0.062 -0.076 
SPNJAARD  -0.014 -0.040 0.022 -0.013 -0.036 -0.036 -0.065 -0.040 -0.028 -0.098 
WBHO  -0.023 -0.005 -0.104 0.073 0.004 0.007 -0.082 0.121 -0.029 -0.086 
YORKCOR   -0.008 -0.234 -0.313* -0.087 -0.009 0.222 -0.005 -0.006 0.106 0.029 
* Means coefficient is twice its computed standard error and therefore significant at 5% level. 
 
Table 6.3 Partial correlation coefficients of tir   
Companies          Lags             
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
AECI  -0.093 -0.124 0.002 0.012 -0.031 -0.059 0.082 -0.030 -0.074 -0.057 
AFGLASS  -0.048 -0.095 0.046 -0.126 0.012 0.120 0.021 -0.090 0.008 -0.049 
AFROX  -0.084 -0.034 0.044 -0.038 -0.081 0.002 0.007 -0.054 -0.160* -0.075 
ALTECH  0.089 -0.080 -0.051 -0.106 -0.017 -0.011 -0.133* 0.031 0.087 0.089 
ALTRON  -0.022 -0.112 0.086 0.073 -0.037 0.001 -0.078 0.022 -0.142* 0.077 
ARGENT  -0.179 -0.092 -0.018 0.053 0.005 -0.073 -0.025 0.085 0.051 -0.137 
AVENG  -0.013 -0.195* -0.020 -0.007 -0.030 -0.090 0.006 0.052 0.098 -0.006 
BASREAD  -0.052 0.016 -0.144* -0.070 -0.007 0.155* 0.008 0.063 0.049 -0.064 
BELL  -0.152* -0.210* 0.047 0.016 0.105 0.025 0.049 -0.036 0.016 0.065 
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BICAF  -0.199 0.074 0.176 -0.046 -0.138 0.158 -0.159 -0.052 -0.152 -0.175 
BUILDMAX  -0.223* -0.266* 0.022 -0.017 -0.024 0.086 -0.014 -0.030 -0.112 -0.099 
CASHBUILD  0.127 -0.055 0.001 -0.044 0.023 0.115 0.017 0.089 0.063 0.102 
CEMENCO  -0.179 -0.056 -0.183 -0.070 -0.060 0.095 -0.004 -0.074 -0.349* -0.103 
CERAMIC  -0.098 -0.010 0.022 -0.047 -0.092 -0.034 -0.040 -0.034 -0.121 -0.016 
CHEMSERVE  -0.017 -0.003 0.043 -0.121 -0.062 -0.054 0.072 -0.029 0.084 -0.054 
CONCOR  0.167* -0.019 0.115 -0.131 0.109 -0.084 0.001 -0.017 0.101 -0.083 
CONTROL  -0.035 -0.054 0.055 -0.121 -0.090 -0.052 0.003 0.115 -0.077 -0.003 
COPI  -0.072 0.038 0.058 -0.024 -0.129 0.063 0.112 0.046 -0.036 0.042 
DAWN  -0.135* 0.046 0.004 -0.197* 0.035 -0.104 -0.012 -0.067 -0.053 0.052 
DELTA  -0.010 -0.025 0.111 0.030 0.050 -0.151* -0.011 -0.104 -0.043 -0.067 
DIGICOR  -0.262* -0.090 -0.037 0.081 -0.045 -0.080 0.088 0.017 0.035 -0.095 
ELBGROUP  0.028 -0.016 -0.057 -0.076 -0.055 0.028 0.001 0.091 -0.030 0.001 
GRINTEK  -0.168* -0.032 0.156* 0.095 -0.001 -0.003 -0.009 0.033 0.008 -0.041 
GROUP_501  -0.129 -0.027 -0.071 -0.026 -0.047 0.156* 0.052 0.031 -0.081 0.147* 
HIVELD  -0.135* 0.063 -0.146* -0.020 -0.019 -0.017 -0.026 -0.041 0.015 -0.129 
HOWDEN  -0.045 -0.105 -0.099 -0.028 -0.042 -0.029 -0.010 -0.078 0.040 0.016 
HUDACO  0.028 0.038 -0.034 -0.049 0.011 -0.105 0.051 -0.068 -0.039 0.068 
ILAD  -0.147* -0.131* -0.085 0.076 -0.175* -0.073 -0.015 -0.249* 0.057 0.139* 
IMPERIAL  -0.230* 0.153* 0.050 0.019 0.059 0.023 -0.006 -0.174 0.030 -0.236* 
INVICTA  -0.218* 0.009 -0.023 -0.067 -0.008 -0.007 0.037 -0.025 0.076 0.045 
ISCOR  0.037 -0.037 0.005 0.022 -0.009 0.008 -0.068 0.051 0.147* 0.053 
IST  -0.127 0.141 -0.045 -0.006 -0.018 0.121 -0.006 0.017 0.025 0.084 
ITLTILE  0.201* -0.020 -0.022 -0.106 -0.005 0.024 0.072 -0.062 -0.086 0.051 
JASCO  -0.032 -0.067 0.066 -0.015 -0.071 0.104 -0.068 0.048 0.051 -0.027 
KAIROS  -0.289* -0.218* -0.152* -0.097 -0.018 0.000 -0.068 -0.012 -0.044 -0.055 
M_R_HLD01  -0.106 0.108 -0.068 -0.093 0.042 0.029 0.019 -0.060 -0.043 0.009 
MASNITE  0.016 -0.091 0.036 -0.009 0.005 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.005 
MONTE  -0.005 0.039 -0.037 -0.032 0.065 -0.364* 0.137 -0.066 -0.054 0.003 
OMNIA  -0.066 0.163* -0.024 0.089 -0.003 0.025 -0.054 0.049 -0.001 -0.013 
PASDEC  -0.164 -0.118 -0.083 0.031 -0.057 -0.132 0.083 0.031 -0.010 -0.072 
PPC  -0.031 -0.061 -0.081 -0.077 0.018 0.028 0.044 -0.074 0.007 -0.097 
REUNET  -0.145* -0.033 -0.140* -0.118 -0.021 -0.003 -0.053 0.055 0.024 -0.027 
SAPPI  -0.079 -0.055 0.042 -0.023 0.064 -0.039 -0.034 0.048 0.015 -0.096 
SEKUNJALO  -0.167 -0.135 0.059 0.170 -0.192 0.077 -0.033 0.034 -0.002 -0.094 
SETHOLD  -0.263* -0.109 -0.035 -0.105 0.077 0.044 -0.061 -0.010 -0.056 -0.131* 
SPNJAARD  -0.014 -0.040 0.021 -0.014 -0.034 -0.038 -0.069 -0.044 -0.035 -0.104 
WBHO  -0.023 -0.005 -0.104 0.069 0.006 -0.003 -0.068 0.117 -0.028 -0.104 
YORKCOR   -0.008 -0.234 -0.335* -0.206 -0.244 -0.005 -0.176 -0.074 0.152 0.087 
* Means coefficient is twice its computed standard error and therefore significant at 5% level. 
 
Both the partial correlation coefficients and the autocorrelation coefficients show that 
there is little dependency in stock returns at 5% level of significance, even for the first 
lag. All the correlation coefficients are negative for the first lag, except for five shares, 
but only 14 of the 48 shares have significantly correlated returns for that first lag. Four 
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stocks have significantly correlated returns for both the first and the second lag. The 
significant coefficients for higher lags apparently do not follow an observable pattern; 
they are therefore best attributed to chance. There is no notable difference between the 
results from partial correlation analysis and autocorrelation analysis.   
 
Although the stocks with significantly correlated returns for the first lag constitute almost 
a third of the sample, they have little in common. They have different market 
capitalisation values and different P/E ratios, they even have different frequencies in 
trading (See Appendix A-1). If shares with a common characteristic, say thinly traded 
shares, showed similar coefficients, then that characteristic would be used to isolate them. 
Some studies have found that shares with low P/E ratios and shares from small firms tend 
to earn excess returns (Merrill Lynch Survey)12. In this research, the shares with 
significant correlation coefficients have little in common; therefore it is difficult to isolate 
cause of the inefficiency and relate it to a particular class or group of shares. This kind of 
correlation can only be exploited on a stock-by-stock basis; but the analyst has to isolate 
the individual stocks whose returns are correlated before determining the nature of the 
correlation. 
 
One of the reasons why emerging markets are expected to show significant departures 
from market efficiency is the thin trading that is prevalent in these markets. It would 
therefore not be unreasonable to expect the thinly traded stocks to show significantly 
correlated returns. However, on the JSE, thin trading and inefficiency are apparently not 
related, once the returns are controlled for thin trading. Of the 14 stocks whose returns 
show significant correlation for the first lag, four were traded 100% of the time, four had 
a trading frequency of 99% and five had a trading frequency of between 85% and 99%. 
Of the 10 thinly traded stocks (whose trading frequency is less than 80%), only one (i.e. 
Buildmax) has significant correlation coefficients for the first and second lags. 
 
There is little evidence of serial correlation and where it is present it is only for the first 
lag. Some of the stocks returns are significantly correlated but profits may fall away 
                                                 
12
 As cited in Damodaran (1996: 176). 
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when transaction costs are taken in to account. It is therefore concluded that the JSE can 
be taken as informationally efficient in the weak sense.  
 
As noted previously, while non-zero correlation implies dependence, zero correlation per 
se does not mean independence; it only shows the absence of linear relationships. In fact 
technical analysts feel that they have often been wrongly accused of finding linear 
relationships where there is none. Analysts argue that they follow geometric patterns (i.e. 
double bottoms, head-and-shoulders, support and resistance levels),and that they find 
momentum and other movement indicators, most of which are not linear, and some of 
which are qualitative as opposed to quantitative. It is therefore unfair to dismiss technical 
analysis on the absence of (quantitative) linear relationships.   
 
Mlambo et al. (2003) employed essentially the same methodology when testing the 
random walk hypothesis on four African stock markets, (they used daily closing prices 
and their data spanned from January 1997 to May 2002). Their findings are used here to 
discuss the efficiency of the JSE in comparison with these markets. All the four markets 
that were tested exhibited dependency in stock returns higher than that found on the JSE. 
While less than 30% of JSE stock returns showed significant correlation the percentages 
for Egypt, Kenya, Morocco and Zimbabwe were 72, 67, 52 and 48% respectively.  
 
For Egypt, Morocco and Zimbabwe the majority of the correlation coefficients were 
positive, implying that these markets are ‘slow learning markets.’ Mlambo et al. (2003) 
concluded that in these markets information arrives slowly, and that it is factored slowly 
into market prices. The correlation coefficients of JSE stock returns were found to be 
negative, which means that the share prices tend to overreact, and subsequently make a 
‘correcting movement’ in the next trading period; however this overreaction is 
insignificant for most of the stocks, making the JSE efficient in the weak sense.  
 
Price adjustment to new information is expected to be more instantaneous on the JSE 
than on the other African stock markets because the JSE’s information dissemination and 
trading systems are more advanced than that of the other African markets. While these 
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markets also provide informational support to market participants, their informational 
support is not as ‘real time’ as is SENS. The settlement systems are not yet fully 
electronic and trading is still open outcry on physical trading floors in the cases of 
Zimbabwe and Kenya. Trading therefore still has a considerable degree of location 
dependence. All this contributes to friction in the matching and trading process, causing a 
slow reaction of prices to information.  
 
Liquidity and turnover at the JSE is substantially higher than on these other four markets. 
Information is factored into prices through trading therefore higher liquidity is consistent 
with more instantaneous adjustment of prices to information. 
 
4.0 Graphical analysis 
 
The movements in the All Share index and the Top 40 is presented in Graphs 6.1 to 6.4 
below. The graphical analysis by technical analysts is certainly more intensive and 
complicated than the one presented here, but for the purposes of illustrating simple trends 
this will suffice.   
 
Both the All Share index and the Top 40 index exhibited a notable trend for all periods up 
to, and including, 1999. The indices follow an upward trend from January to April and 
fall in May. In 1993 and 1994 the All Share index continue rising in May and June but 
for all the other years May returns are negative. From 2000 onwards the trend disappears, 
both indices apparently begin to follow a random pattern, or rather a pattern that cannot 
be picked from simple graphical analysis (See Graph 6.3).  
 
The ‘April peak’ is clear enough to present a trading opportunity. A portfolio, which 
tracks either the All Share Index or the Top 40, could be constructed at the beginning of 
the year and liquidated in April before the index falls in May. Although the indices did 
not fall in May 1993 and May 1994 profit could still be made if an investor went long on 
the index and subsequently closed the position in April. 
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Graph 6.1 The All Share index for 1993 to 1999 
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Graph 6.2 The Top 40 index for 1996 to 1999 
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Graph 6.3 The All Share index for 2000 to 2003 
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Graph 6.4 The Top 40 index for 2000 to 2003 
 
-
2,000.0
4,000.0
6,000.0
8,000.0
10,000.0
12,000.0
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
2003
2000
2002
2001
No April peak
 
 
 
 
 83 
The reasons why indices peaked in April and dropped in May are subject to speculation 
and no definite reason can be submitted. For a technical analyst it is more important to 
identify ‘price stations’ and the rallies as they occur than to find out why they are 
occurring (Russell, 2002). According to Reilly and Brown (2003), fundamental 
information is the least of the technical analyst’s concern as long as the trends are 
recognizable and present a trading opportunity.  
 
The disappearance of the ‘April peak’ and the ‘May slump’, from 2000 onwards, 
illustrates how linear trends cannot be sustained over a long time, though it is not 
conclusive proof that there are no other exploitable features in the price trends after 1999. 
Whether or not there exist non-linear relationships, which can be profitably exploited, 
remains to be tested. Non-linear relationships in the price changes are beyond the scope 
of this study.  
 
Fama (1965) noted that dependence of price changes is of such a complicated form that 
standard statistical analysis, such as the runs tests and serial correlation tests, may 
underestimate the degree of dependence. Fama and Blume (1966) therefore investigated 
whether filter rules could be used to earn superior returns. They found a strong 
compatibility between the filter results and the serial correlation tests results, such that if 
indeed the serial correlation tests fail to uncover some dependence in the return series, the 
same dependence remain hidden from filter tests. The main shortfall of correlation tests is 
that they cannot provide the exact estimate of expected profits from mechanical trading 
rules such as the filter rules. However, for measuring the direction and degree of 
dependence in price changes, the correlation tests are just as powerful as the Alexandrian 
filter rules (Fama and Blume, 1966). 
 
The disappearance of the trend from 2000 onwards is here interpreted as a change from 
inefficiency to weak form efficiency. In the late 1990s and the early 2000s there was a 
massive advent of funds, which track indices, including the All Share and the Top 40 
indices. As managers of these funds battle to profit from these trends it is expected that 
the recognizable trends would be eliminated. Unit trusts managed to pool funds that 
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might otherwise have been too little to be invested on the stock market. This increased 
the supply of funds available for investment as well as the number of market participants, 
both passive and active.  Therefore, in addition to eliminating trends in the indices, the 
multiplication of unit trusts contributed directly to the increase of liquidity on the JSE. 
 
The introduction of the SENS and STRATE also contributed to the improvement of the 
JSE’s efficiency. The electronic trading system improved the settlement and clearing 
system of the exchange, thus reducing friction in the trading process. The more liquid a 
market is the more informationally efficient it is expected to be.  
 
Hall and Urga (2002) submitted that emerging markets are expected to “start from an 
inefficient status and move towards an efficient behaviour” (Hall and Urga, 2002: 3). In 
their research they demonstrated that on the Russian Stock Exchange, there were 
significant signs of inefficiency at the beginning of their testing period, but these 
inefficiencies tended to disappear from the middle of 1999 onwards. Following its 
recovery from the 1998 Asian crisis and the return of political stability in the country 
after the 1997 instability, the Russian Stock Exchange experienced a significant increase 
in activity from mid-1999. There was significant increase in the volume of trading, 
liquidity, listing of new companies and also in the returns realised on the stock market.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH  
 
1.0 Conclusions 
 
The main aim of this study was to test the weak form efficiency of the JSE. In an efficient 
market successive price changes are independent and therefore uncorrelated; hence 
efficiency was tested using correlation tests. The correlation tests performed showed that 
there is little evidence of dependence in successive returns of shares listed on the JSE. 
Where dependence exists it is limited; the correlation coefficients are just slightly greater 
than would be expected in a purely random series. Hence it was concluded that the JSE is 
an efficient market.  
 
Efficiency of the JSE had earlier been rejected on the basis that stock returns exhibited 
serial correlation (See Jammine and Hawkins, 1974; Hadassin, 1976; Gilbertson and 
Roux, 1977 and 1978, among others). It was however found in this research that the JSE 
is an efficient market. The difference in results can be interpreted to mean that the JSE 
has improved from being an inefficient market to be an informationally efficient market, 
at least in the weak sense; in which case it can be concluded that the initiatives to 
improve the exchange’s efficiency have yielded positive results.  
 
SENS was implemented to ensure early, equal and wide dissemination of all price 
sensitive information. Its introduction is expected to have contributed directly to the 
informational efficiency of the JSE through the efficient use of the now readily available 
information. The introduction of automated trading and clearing system also reduced the 
friction in the trading process. If the market is liquid, then all perceived inefficiencies 
could be readily arbitraged, making the market efficient.    
 
As noted earlier, independence can be established through the existence of either astute 
chart readers, actively competing to profit from any dependence in the return series, or 
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fundamental analysts who can interpret economic and political events and ‘correctly’ 
evaluate the eventual effects of such information on share prices. But if price changes are 
no longer dependent, they cannot profit from reading the charts, or if all information is 
fully incorporated into the prices superior analysis will not be rewarded, in which case it 
appears that they will have defeated their own purpose. However, in practice, such 
sweeping statements appear to be inconsistent with superior intrinsic value analysis and 
astute chart reading. There still exists a wide chasm between the conclusion that markets 
are efficient and the conclusion that professional analysts are no better than anyone else 
in their investment decisions.  
 
Analysts who can continually make a superior evaluation of the effects of political and 
economic events on share prices can make larger profits than those who do not have the 
same expertise; so will superior chart readers. The fact that the activities of astute traders 
contribute to the efficiency in price changes does not imply that the profits made from 
such activities cannot be greater than those expected from a buy-and-hold strategy.  
 
It is interesting to note that most of the researchers interpret the theory to mean that an 
efficient market makes the investment manager’s expertise obsolete. Though many strove 
to prove that active asset management and efficient markets are not complementary, there 
is not enough proof that these two are exclusive. In fact, the conclusion that active asset 
management is inconsistent with efficient markets seems to be heavily premised on the 
assumption that asset managers try to predict the future prices and beat the market. But, 
as noted in Chapter 3, modern portfolio theory acknowledges that prices can move up as 
much as they can drop, so managers do not necessarily predict the likely future prices, 
but construct well-diversified portfolios that are hedged against risk. Of course all 
investment managers will pounce on every bit of information that can help them make 
better estimates of future prices, but it is apparent that there is more to asset management 
than predicting stock prices and/or searching for overvalued or undervalued securities. 
 
While the EMH is well-established and robust hypothesis, there still exists a gap between 
the hypothesis and practice. The majority of activities of stock market participants – 
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professional and lay, informed and ill informed – still appears to be premised strongly on 
the assumption that share prices incorrectly reflect underlying values with a margin and 
frequency that is sufficient to justify a policy of actively trying to outperform the market. 
Most index funds do not only target a benchmark index but seeks to outperform it. Some 
funds even have targeting undervalued securities as their main investment philosophy.  
 
It is fairly easy to present and justify the EMH theoretically but the empirical robustness 
of model is still questionable. Many testing methods and procedures have been developed 
and used but it is still unclear what these tests can prove and cannot; no wonder that after 
so many years of research and scrutiny it is still called a ‘hypothesis.’ Quoting Samuelson 
(1965: 48), “One should not read too much into the established theorem. It does not prove 
that actual competitive markets work well. It does not say that … randomness of price 
changes will be a good thing. It does not prove that anyone who makes money in 
speculation is ipso facto deserving the gain ... All or none of these may be true …”  
 
1.0 Possible areas of further research 
 
Most of the research in market efficiency, including this one, has concentrated on using 
statistical tests to investigate dependence in returns. The results are often used to make 
conclusions on the relevance of various chartist techniques. However, technical analysts 
claim that the techniques they use are so varied that their relevance cannot be proved or 
disproved by simple statistical analysis. It will therefore be more useful to directly test 
the relevance of the various chartist theories and techniques popular in today’s finance 
world, and even compare their performance against each other.  
 
It was assumed that the advent of funds in the late 90s has made a significant contribution 
to the efficiency of the JSE by improving liquidity and market participants. The actual 
contribution made by these funds can be investigated in further research. It could also be 
worthwhile to simulate the JSE as it would have been without these funds and compare it 
with the JSE now.      
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A-1 Companies as at 03 August 2003 
 
Founded Listed No of shares Earnings/ 
share (c) 
Share 
price (c)  
Price/ 
Earning 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Trading 
Frequency  
AECI 1924 1966 104200208 151.00 2600 17.22 2709205408 100.00 
AFGLASS 1980 1999 195477974 15.50 195 12.58 381182049 98.58 
AFROX 1927 1964 342853084 167.00 1560 9.34 5348508110 100.00 
ALTECH 1947 1967 105216810 143.90 2620 18.21 2756680422 100.00 
ALTRON 1947 1958 97174115 64.10 880 13.73 855132212 98.33 
ARGENT 1994 1994 67090051 83.60 320 3.83 214688163 100.00 
AVENG 1944 1999 396145908 118.60 950 8.01 3763386126 98.11 
BASREAD 1984 1987 55100000 4.55 140 30.77 77140000 98.33 
BELL 1968 1995 9422400 43.00 520 12.09 48996480 99.58 
BICAF 1945 1945 31859000 61.30 60 0.98 19115400 12.97 
BUILDMAX 1995 1996 41805634 1.30 19 14.62 7943070 51.88 
CASHBUILD 1978 1986 23244812 196.30 1740 8.86 404459729 95.40 
CEMENCO 1926 1967 18952000 58.80 600 10.20 113712000 34.73 
CERAMIC 1987 1992 18263543 706.50 6200 8.78 1132339666 98.74 
CHEMSRVE 1946 1967 83916630 118.10 1957 16.57 1642248449 98.74 
CONCOR 1948 1981 13347594 156.90 910 5.80 121463105 87.03 
CONTROL 1964 1987 86268426 19.30 80 4.15 69014741 99.58 
COPI 1961  17578125 1.83 9200 5027.32 1617187500 63.60 
DAWN 1984 1987 179232432 17.11 87 5.08 155932216 99.16 
DELTA 1919 1983 49165553 213.10 4300 20.18 2114118779 99.58 
DIGICOR 1985 1998 239256113 7.41 27 3.64 64599151 99.16 
ELBGROUP 1930 1951 30860000 -5.00 450 -90.00 138870000 97.49 
GRINTEK 1955 1989 294395429 7.00 105 15.00 309115200 100.00 
GROUP_501 1969 1974 73573023 111.30 578 5.19 425252073 99.58 
HIVELD 1960 1969 97840108 19.10 1390 72.77 1359977501 100.00 
HOWDEN 1996 1996 65729109 15.49 103 6.65 67700982 81.17 
HUDACO 1891 1985 31469112 115.60 1900 16.44 597913128 89.54 
ILAD 1973 1998 147200000 30.50 310 10.16 456320000 99.58 
IMPERIAL 1951 1987 216968270 700.20 5975 8.53 12963854133 100.00 
INVICTA 1966 1987 77227154 63.00 600 9.52 463362924 93.72 
ISCOR 1928 1989 455753132 557.00 1661 2.98 7570059523 100.00 
IST 1980 1998 143489593 10.20 130 12.75 186536471 100.00 
ITLTILE 1968 1988 18677283 655.60 5502 8.39 1027624111 84.52 
JASCO 1976 1987 48811582 -2.30 100 -43.48 48811582 100.00 
KAIROS 1975 1987 253085399 -0.53 7 -13.21 17715978 89.12 
M_R_HLD 1948 1968 331892619 175.00 1280 7.31 4248225523 100.00 
MASNITE 1942 1952 6832116 120.00 1215 10.13 83010209 66.53 
MONTE 1982 1982 6536543 -8.00 1400 -175.00 91511602 36.00 
OMNIA 1953 1980 40722475 631.85 1880 2.98 765582530 96.23 
PASDEC 1964 1988 55963956 21.80 110 5.05 61560352 53.14 
PPC 1892 1910 53743539 441.00 10100 22.90 5428097439 100.00 
REUNET 1888 1948 206015764 115.40 1775 15.38 3656779811 100.00 
SAPPI 1936 1937 239071892 92.00 9050 98.37 21636006226 100.00 
SEKUNJALO 1996 1999 86688898 2.03 54 26.60 46812005 76.58 
SETHOLD 1996 1997 242420124 3.10 33 10.65 79998641 97.91 
SPNJAARD 1960 1987 5700000 12.60 160 12.70 9120000 20.08 
WBHO 1975 1988 55590500 182.50 1150 6.30 639290750 99.58 
YORKCOR 1916 1946 11040497 14.90 174 11.68 19210465 23.01 
Source: Profile Data, [ www.profile.co.za ] 
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Appendix A-2 The FTSE/ JSE Africa Index Series   
 
 
The FTSE /JSE All Share Index 
 
   Years     
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 
 
JAN 
 
3,432.8 
 
4,754.6 
 
5,054.1 
 
6,309.5 
 
6,142.2 
 
5,993.3 
 
5,544.2 
 
FEB 3,418.1 4,845.7 5,147.1 6,131.3 6,561.0 6,454.9 5,670.2  
MAR 3,560.0 4,939.1 5,281.9 6,191.0 6,494.3 6,935.0 6,108.4  
APR 3,733.0 5,359.1 5,479.1 6,463.4 6,568.0 7,582.8 6,831.4  
MAY 3,992.5 5,396.1 5,471.4 6,335.4 6,419.6 6,965.3 6,285.1  
JUN 4,077.9 5,404.1 5,420.7 6,334.4 6,811.5 6,186.5 6,875.2  
JUL 4,176.7 5,651.9 5,438.5 6,093.4 6,885.7 6,509.7 6,973.3  
AUG 4,034.3 5,833.8 5,543.4 6,203.5 6,671.5 4,581.2 6,809.5  
SEP 3,770.4 5,676.1 5,657.3 6,361.8 6,505.2 4,790.8 6,759.7  
OCT 3,916.2 5,724.0 5,789.1 6,425.6 5,969.9 5,466.5 7,078.4  
NOV 4,164.3 5,756.3 5,972.1 6,198.0 5,722.5 5,307.7 7,571.3  
DEC 4,893.0 5,866.9 6,228.4 6,113.8 5,609.9 5,127.9 8,555.8  
 
   
    
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
    
 
JAN 
 
8,445.2 
 
9,124.0 
 
10,333.5 
 
8,798.4 
    
FEB 7,916.9 9,097.6 10,875.1 8,402.1     
MAR 7,949.8 8,267.5 11,015.0 7,679.9     
APR 7,419.0 9,083.1 11,007.7 7,510.4     
MAY 7,337.3 9,459.1 11,200.9 8,564.3     
JUN 7,738.2 9,274.3 10,657.7 8,352.2     
JUL 7,790.9 8,627.5 9,239.0 8,809.6     
AUG 8,547.3 9,067.2 9,677.3 9,078.1     
SEP 8,327.7 8,160.4 9,465.3      
OCT 8,202.7 8,645.4 9,376.2      
NOV 7,868.1 9,595.0 9,563.7      
DEC 8,330.2 10,668.6 9,277.2      
 
 
 
        
The Top  40 
 
   
Years 
   
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 
JAN 
 
 6,220.5 
 
6,023.4 
 
 5,691.1 
 
 5,026.0 
 
 7,656.8 
 
 8,718.7 
 
9,996.8 
 
8,183.2 
FEB 
 6,034.9  6,453.5  6,083.6  5,057.8  7,194.0  8,712.0  10,589.6  7,796.6 
MAR 
 6,173.7  6,356.7  6,538.8  5,402.0  7,278.4  7,819.5  10,722.8  7,095.8 
APR 
 6,391.0  6,488.5  7,066.4  6,158.0  6,835.4  8,705.4  10,734.4  6,924.5 
MAY 
 6,329.5  6,298.8  6,365.1  5,666.6  6,869.0  9,116.8  10,846.8  7,940.1 
JUN 
 6,303.0  6,623.3  5,625.7  6,251.8  7,206.1  8,853.7  10,233.4  7,680.7 
JUL 
 5,972.3  6,591.2  5,921.7  6,413.4  7,275.1  8,124.7  8,768.2  8,088.2 
AUG 
 6,150.6  6,359.9  4,151.0  6,270.4  8,047.3  8,538.6  9,226.0  
SEP 
 6,300.9  6,200.6  4,364.0  6,292.3  7,853.0  7,618.6  8,991.8  
OCT 
 6,358.5  5,617.8  5,040.3  6,553.8  7,793.8  8,104.4  8,850.3  
NOV 
 6,113.5  5,392.3  4,885.1  6,928.9  7,442.3  8,993.5  8,991.9  
DEC 
 6,007.9  5,297.6  4,628.6  7,841.7  7,966.7 10,074.4  8,682.0  
 
